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by 
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Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering 
 
Abstract 
 
MIDAS is the minor incident decision analysis software that acts as an advisory tool for 
plant decision makers and operators to analyze the available decision alternatives for 
resolving minor incidents.  The minor incidents dealt with in this thesis include non-
safety related component failure, equipment maintenance, inspection or testing. 
 
MIDAS implements the risk-informed decision analysis methodology that uses multi-
attribute utility theory (MAUT) and formal decision-making models that was developed 
for nuclear power plants.  MIDAS integrates the theory, practical models and the 
graphical user interfaces for analysts to quickly obtain the insight regarding the 
performance of decision options and driving factors.  To be able to deal with the inherent 
diversity of scenarios and decision options, a well-defined option models and modular 
calculation structure were constructed in MIDAS.  In addition, MIDAS provides the 
functions of performing sensitivity and uncertainty analyses to take into account the 
inherent model and parameter uncertainties in decision option evaluation. 
 
Two case studies are performed to demonstrate the application of MIDAS in nuclear 
power plant risk-informed incident management.  The insight obtained from the analysis 
results of case studies reveals that for nuclear power plant incident management, risk 
usually is not the most important concern.  Cost and external attention are usually the 
dominant deciding factors in decision-making.  However, in fact, the safety performance 
of each option is reflected in terms of the cost and external attention. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Due to the sophisticated nature of nuclear energy generation and control, as well as its 
specific safety concerns, nuclear power plants are inevitably built as very complicated 
engineering systems.  In addition, hundreds of plant managers, operators and workers 
need to work on their assigned jobs for plant everyday operation and maintenance.  Such 
complex systems are failure and error prone, including mechanical failures, transient 
events and human error.  According to the magnitude and context, those abnormal events 
could induce severe accidents.  To prevent the occurrence of unintended events and to 
mitigate the accident consequence are always the most important issues in nuclear reactor 
safety. 
 
For nuclear power plants, severe accidents are with very low probability of occurrence, 
while incidents, with less serious consequence, are supposed possible to happen more 
frequently during normal operation.  Specified procedures were set to follow to defense 
accidents or to mitigate the consequences.  For instance, in a loss of coolant accident 
(LOCA), the emergency core coolant system (ECCS) should operate in sequence 
according to the reactor cooling system pressure drop rate.  For severe nuclear accidents, 
safety (mitigation of the consequence, preventing radioactivity release and protection of 
the public) is always the first and only concern. 
 
However, usually there are several ways available to resolve an incident happening in a 
nuclear power plant, because the severity is much minor and the safety is not the only 
factor to be considered.  For example, in a pressurized water reactor (PWR), a small leak 
of steam generator tube will increase the radioactivity in secondary side.  If the leak rate 
is small enough, the operator could choose to mitigate this incident by normal coolant 
makeup from chemical and volume control system (CVCS) and continue operation at full 
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power; or cold shutdown the reactor and repair the leaking tube; or reduce the power 
level (e.g. 90% rated) to partially mitigate the leak rate until next outage. 
 
Other concerns besides safety regarding resolving an incident could be economics, 
radiological dose, publicity and stakeholder relationship, even though safety can be still 
the most important one.  They are the attributes, or objectives, of the decision-making 
problem.  Among those options that can be adopted to resolve an incident, the best option 
should be the one that could obtains a balance among those attributes and reaches an 
optimal benefit (or least damage) than other options.  There should be a decision making 
process through which managers and engineers discuss and evaluate all working 
alternatives and make the decision.  In the past, plant decision makers made decision in a 
qualitative way based on their knowledge, experience and judgment, which could be 
misleading, because it is a complicated multiple attribute, multi-criteria problem.  
Therefore, it is the motivation that to develop an analytical method that helps plant 
decision makers to analyze available options with the usage of risk information and make 
the best decision toward resolving an incident. 
 
Another reason makes incident decision analysis possible is the factor of time.  For 
accidents, the time-scales are usually short (in seconds or minutes) and do not allow 
operators to do a deliberated decision analysis.  However, more time is available for 
managing minor incidents, because the components of interest are not safety-critical or 
the incidents are merely scheduled inspection or maintenance. 
 
It is difficult to give an accurate definition of incident.  Generally speaking, incidents 
refer to minor accidents that would not cause an immediate automatic reactor shutdown 
and induce core damage.  Incidents are distinguished from accidents not only in terms of 
their less severity, but also in that “an incident can be caused intentionally” [1].  
Therefore, non-safety related component failures, abnormal system transient, equipment 
inspection, maintenance and testing are all incidents.  In this thesis, “minor incidents” are 
more specifically referred to those minor events that are repairable by workers, and could 
be fixed with more than one option or scenario. 
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The main topic of this thesis is analyzing and evaluating decision options that toward 
fixing a certain minor incident in terms of the concerned attributes specified in advance 
and making the optimal decision.  That is a part of the content of incident management, 
which is to design, analyze and select the appropriate method to resolve incidents.  A 
risk-informed formal decision analysis method based on multi-attribute utility theory 
(MAUT) has been proposed [2] to quantify and investigate decision options in terms of 
the concerned attributes and decision makers’ preferences.  Through this decision 
analysis process, the analyst can obtain insights about the pros and cons of each available 
option quantitatively, and understand how each attribute affect the performance of each 
decision alternative.  The final decision resulted from this informed process should make 
the plant safer, avoid worker and public risk, reduce costs, maintain good relationship 
with regulators, publicity and stakeholders, and make the utility company more 
competitive. 
 
Evolved from Smith’s work [2], a new version of minor incident management 
methodology was proposed with further well-defined option models and a more modular 
analysis structure.  An incident decision-making advisory computer program was 
constructed based on the new methodology and models, which is the center part of this 
thesis – Minor Incident Decision Analysis Software, MIDAS. 
 
1.2 Overview of MIDAS 
To implement the minor incident methodology in a convenient facility, a PC application 
was developed, which is MIDAS (Minor Incident Decision Analysis Software).  MIDAS 
is a stand-alone, window-driven, graphic user-interface application, which was written in 
Microsoft Visual BASIC.  MIDAS can be executed on any PC running Microsoft 
Windows 95/98/2000/XP of any language version and supports Microsoft ADO (ActiveX 
Data Object) interface that is needed for data base access. 
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MIDAS is an incident management tool for nuclear power plants.  It was designed to help 
plant managers, staff, supporting engineers, or operating engineers in assessment of the 
decision options to resolve minor incidents or event scenarios, ranking those options, 
investigating the driving factors affecting option performance, and helping making 
optimal decision. 
 
MIDAS is a prototypical advisory facility that results from the project “The Use of PSA 
to Support Operational Decision Making in Nuclear Power Plants” sponsored by an 
electric utility company.  The decision-making architecture and model parameters are 
derived from the perception and preference of the managers and engineers in the utility 
company, for their 1300MWe PWRs.  The PSA model and risk information of that type 
of reactors [3] are used in MIDAS as well. 
 
Although the methodology and software are developed for the application of nuclear 
power plants, the philosophy and principles are applicable to other industry.  MIDAS was 
constructed as flexible as possible that almost all needed model parameters are regarded 
as adjustable input values and stored in a knowledge base.  However, the decision-
making architecture was embedded in MIDAS source code and cannot be modified by 
general users.  To apply the methodology and software to decision-making applications 
other than nuclear power plant incident management, the decision-making architecture 
should be re-considered and adjusted, and the source code of MIDAS should be modified 
accordingly. 
 
The risk-informed decision making methodology and the specific settings used in nuclear 
power plant minor incident management are described in Chapter 2.  The practical 
models implemented in MIDAS to perform risk-informed decision analysis are described 
in Chapter 3.  In addition, some specific features of MIDAS are also presented in that 
chapter.  In Chapter 4, two case studies analyzed by MIDAS are presented to demonstrate 
the application of minor incident management and the ability of MIDAS.  Appendix I is 
the revised MIDAS user’s manual that explains the usage of MIDAS as an advisory and 
analyzing tool, from general user’s point of view.  MIDAS programmer’s manual is 
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presented in Appendix II, which is the document describing the structure of MIDAS 
source code that is useful for programmers to maintain or modify MIDAS. 
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Chapter 2 Risk-informed Decision-making 
Methodology 
 
2.1 Multiattribute Utility Theory 
The decision-making process toward finding the optimal option to resolve an incident 
happening in a nuclear power is complicate, because there are several concerned 
attributes (e.g. safety, cost, publicity, … etc.) to be considered.  Furthermore, decision 
maker has specific preference on each attribute with respect to the given problem, and 
there are usually multiple decision makers with different perspectives and preferences.  
Tradeoff between those attributes and decision makers’ preferences make the decision 
problem difficult to handle.  Quantifying the attributes and preferences, and evaluate 
decision options in an analytical way should be the best method to handle this kind of 
complicated decision problem, which is actually the basic principle of Multi-Attribute 
Utility Theory (MAUT) [4,5].  In order to think the decision problem in a quantitative 
way, the following issues should be considered: 
1. How to find out the concerned attributes, or the decision makers’ objectives, that can 
be expressed and measured quantitatively?  For example, attribute “cost” can be 
counted in its natural unit, dollar, however, how to measure “safety” and “public 
relationship”? 
2. How to consistently quantify those attributes?  For example, how safe is worth to 
spend one million dollars on the given problem?  This question exists because 
attributes are always conflicting (otherwise, decision-making would not be a 
problem).  In other words, how to tradeoff between attributes? 
3. How to quantify decision makers’ preference with respect to each attribute?  Usually 
it is not linear.  The values of money are definitely different for rich and poor. 
4. How to reach a consensus for above issues among decision makers? 
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5. How to quantify, evaluate and compare the performances of decision options with 
respect to the decision makers’ objectives? 
 
MAUT was developed to resolve those issues.  In order to determine decision maker’s 
objectives and the structure of value on the given decision problem, a Value Tree (VT) 
should be developed first.  Value tree is constructed in a systematic and hierarchical way 
through the deliberation of decision makers.  After the value tree is constructed, a set of 
Performance Measures (PMs) can be drawn from it.  PMs are observable and quantitative 
measurable objective items that are used to measure the degree to which the overall 
objective has been achieved, and accordingly used to evaluate the performance of 
decision options.  However, there are always some PMs conflicting with each other.  
Therefore, a set of normalized tradeoff weighting factors (PM weights) are elicited 
through decision makers’ deliberation and assigned to PMs.  PM weights represent the 
relative importance of PMs and are employed to tradeoff between different PMs in a 
decision analysis.  After PMs and their weights are defined for a given decision problem, 
in the following analysis, they are the focus of the problem out of the whole value tree. 
 
In order to quantitatively express decision makers’ preference on each objective, the 
Utility Function (UF) for each PM is elicited.  For each PM, the applicable range should 
be determined first and then determine its utility function through the deliberation of 
decision makers.  That process is made in order to translate the preference on a PM with 
respect to different PM values to the dimensionless utility curve.  Usually utility 
functions are not linear.  After that, decision makers should perform a consistency check 
to assure that the utility functions are compatible and exchangeable.  Therefore, as the 
result, utility functions also serve as communication media among PMs, 
 
Usually there are multiple decision makers involved in a decision problem, especially for 
minor incident management.  Deliberation and negotiation among decision makers are 
necessary and important to reach a consensus in the determination of value tree, 
performance measures, PM weights and utility functions.  Up to this point, issue items 1 
through 4 should be resolved. 
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In the aspect of decision option evaluation, an analysis mechanism should be established.  
Through this analysis mechanism, the performance (or impact) of a decision option with 
respect to each PM can be evaluated and translate to utility value.  If consider 
uncertainty, the utility value should be an “expected” utility value.  The Performance 
Index (PI) for this option is calculated according to the resulting expected utilities and 
PM weights.  PI is the parameter that indicates the performance of a decision option, and 
is used to rank and compare decision options. 
 
Above is a brief description of MAUT.  In the following sections, the application of 
MAUT in minor incident decision analysis is presented. 
 
2.2 Value Tree 
Value tree is the hierarchical structure of decision makers’ objectives and values toward 
the given decision problem.  One of the purposes of value tree is to derive the PMs and 
the PM weights.  Through them, analysts can analytically express decision makers’ 
objectives and evaluate options. 
 
Before decision makers construct the value tree, the problem of interest should be defined 
and find out the overall objective that desire to achieve.  For minor incident decision 
analysis, the overall objective is “Proper Incident Management,” as shown in the top 
layer of Figure 2-1. 
 
From the overall objective, a set of fundamental objectives is determined as Economics, 
Safety, and Stakeholder Relationship, which lie in the second layer of the value tree.  
Fundamental objectives are the most important objectives reflecting what decision 
makers really want to accomplish.  However, fundamental objectives usually are general 
goals, not practically achievable or observable.  Thus, from each fundamental objective, 
one or more means objectives are found.  Means objectives represent the means that help 
achieving the corresponding fundamental objectives and also can estimate the degree to 
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which the fundamental objectives can be achieved.  By the determination of means 
objectives, the desirable observable and measurable objective items – PMs – can be 
derived.  Thus, the distinction between fundamental objectives and means objectives is 
important in constructing value. [4] 
 
 
Figure 2-1. The Value Tree Used in MIDAS 
 
From means objectives, the PMs are derived.  PMs are observable and quantitative 
measurable that their values measure the degree to which the corresponding fundamental 
objective has been achieved, and accordingly used to evaluate the performance of 
decision options.  Figure 2-1 is the final value tree developed for minor incident decision 
analysis, and embedded in MIDAS code.  There are five PMs obtained from this value 
tree, which are located in the bottom of the value tree.  Those PMs and their weights are 
described in detail in the following sections. 
 
Value tree is defined according the decision problem in hand.  In other words, value tree 
is context-dependent.  Different decision problems will generate different value trees, 
because decision makers have different fundamental objectives and preferences, and 
accordingly different PMs and PM weights.  Therefore, the value tree for minor incident 
management is different from that for sever accident management or that for long-term 
power plant operation/maintenance strategy decision analysis.  Furthermore, different 
group of decision makers would generate different value tree.  Therefore, if MIDAS 
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developed for this project is applied to other plant or utility company, the whole 
procedure of determining value tree, PMs, PM weights, and utility functions should be 
performed again. 
 
2.3 Performance Measures 
In the value tree developed for minor incident decision analysis, as shown in Figure 2-1, 
five PMs (Cost, Public Radiological Dose, Worker Radiological Dose, Industrial 
Accidents and External Attention) are obtained in the bottom of the value tree.  There are 
three different types of PMs, depending on how they are calculated during the analysis: 
 
I. Outcome PM: 
It represents the direct consequence of an initiating event.  An example can be the cost 
associated to a LOCA. 
 
II. Repair PM: 
It represents the consequences of a specific repair on the worker force.  It is proportional 
to the number of workers involved in the repair.  For example the radiological dose 
absorbed by the workers depends on the specific repair performed and is also 
proportional to the number of workers involved. 
 
III. Continuous PM: 
It represents a PM whose amount is proportional to time.  For example, the cost 
associated to the loss of production is proportional to plant downtime. 
 
The five PMs are defined as follows: 
 
1) Cost: it represents expected extra costs spent associated with the given option and 
consequences from possible initiating events, comparing to a normal operation without 
failed components.  It is composed by two factors: 
• Downtime cost (continuous PM) 
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• Costs of clean-up and damage incurred in case of initiating events (outcome PM) 
 
2) Worker dose: it represents the average radiological dose received by the worker 
performing the repair (repair PM).  It depends on the type of repair.  The resulting total 
worker dose is proportional to the number of workers involved.  The unit of worker dose 
is Sievert (Sv). 
 
3) Industrial accidents: it represents the physical worker injuries incurred during the 
repair (repair PM).  Three levels of industrial accident are  
• Minor injury: the injury that results in a worker loss the ability to work, but the worker 
can recover after a period of time. 
• Major injury: the injury that results in a permanent physical disabled. 
• Fatality: the accident results in a worker to death. 
 
4) Public dose: it represents the total dose released by the plant in case of initiating 
events happening (outcome PM).  The unit of public dose is Sievert (Sv). 
 
5) External attention: it represents the way the consequences of initiating events are 
reflected outside the plant (outcome PM).  It is described by the formal actions between 
the plant and the regulatory agency.  The levels of this PM are None, Report, Inspection, 
Formal Notice, and Long Shutdown. 
 
2.4 Utility Functions 
The decision makers’ preference with respect to a PM is described by a utility function, 
which is a dimensionless function defined in [0, 1]. 
 
Before utility functions are analyzed, the applicable range and scale of each PM should 
be defined.  Applicable range is the upper and lower bound of possible outcomes for a 
PM in the given problem that can be defined in the early stage – the definition of the 
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decision problem.  Scale is a set of levels of the possible outcomes that dictate different 
degree of achievements to the PM. 
 
In the case of minor incident decision analysis, the utility value for the best outcome is 
assigned to 0, while the worst outcome is assigned to a utility of unity.  The utility for 
each point in the scale is decided through the judgment and deliberation of decision 
makers.  Therefore, the utility functions used in MIDAS are actually the “disutility” 
functions, which a utility with lower value is more desirable. 
 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [6] can be employed to elicit utility functions [2,7,8].  
In short, this method uses pair-wise comparisons between different outcomes in the PM 
scale, and decision maker assigns an integer number between 1 and 9 to describe the 
degree to which one outcome is more important than another.  An AHP matrix is 
constructed from those integers and the utility function can be calculated using the 
principal eigenvector of this matrix.  AHP works very well in the scale that all outcomes 
are in the same order of magnitude.  However, in the case of minor incident decision 
analysis, some PMs do not match this requirement, for instance, “Cost.”  Thus, instead of 
AHP, other three methods are used to elicit utility functions: 
1. Lottery Questionnaire [4]: for Cost, Worker Dose and Public Dose.  In the 
comparison of a designed lottery and a certain outcome, a probability value that is 
decided by decision makers is assigned to the lottery to make them indifferent.  With 
the help of boundary outcomes (assigned utility 0 or 1), the utility of an intermediate 
outcome can be determined.  It is one of the standard methods assessing utility 
functions. 
2. Pair-wise Comparison: for Industrial Accident.  Instead of assigning integer number 
in AHP, this method assigns actual real number representing the relative importance 
between two outcomes.  For example, major injury is ten times more important than 
minor injury.  Utility function can derived through these data. 
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3. Indirect Preference Elicitation: for External Attention.  Assume that the current 
plant status regarding external attention (from regulators) is stable and expected, as 
well as the composition of external attention outcomes represents the preference of 
this PM, then the utility function can be elicited from the annual statistics of various 
external attention events. 
 
For minor incident decision analysis, five utility functions have been obtained and the 
results are implemented in MIDAS.  The applicable range, scale and utility values for 
each PM are summarized in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. The PMs, Weights, Scales and Utility Functions Used in MIDAS 
PM Name 
(Weights) 
Scale Utility Value 
1. Cost 
(0.45039) 
1,000 € 
10,000 € 
100,000 € 
1,000,000 € 
10,000,000 € 
100,000,000 € 
0 
0.000849 
0.003464 
0.014142 
0.067082 
1 
2. Worker dose 
(0.00045) 
0 Sv  
0.00005 Sv 
0.0005 Sv 
0.005 Sv 
0.05 Sv 
0 
0.0000928 
0.000928 
0.027144 
1 
3. Industrial accidents 
(0.008693) 
None 
Minor injury 
Major injury 
Fatality 
0 
0.002 
0.1 
1 
4. Public dose 
(0.270234) 
0 Sv 
0.001 Sv 
0.1 Sv 
1 Sv 
10 Sv 
0 
0.0000928 
0.000928 
0.027144 
1 
5. External attention 
(0.270234) 
None 
Report 
Inspection 
Formal notice 
Long shutdown 
0 
0.0007 
0.01 
0.1 
1 
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2.5 PM Weights 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [6] also can be used to elicit the weights of 
performance measures [2,8,9], prior to determination of utility functions.  In this way, 
AHP performs pair-wise comparison among elements in the same layer and branch of the 
value tree from top to bottom, and assesses the quantitative relative importance of those 
elements, which are the PM weights. 
 
In MIDAS, the method of Measurable Equivalence [2] is used to assess the PM weights.  
Measurable equivalence is a pair of different outcomes of different performance 
measures that the decision maker’s preference is indifferent.  For example, if decision 
makers are willing to spend 200,000€ for reduce the radiological dose released from the 
plant by 1Sv, then the measurable equivalence between Cost and Public Dose can be 
expressed as 200,000€ ≈ 1Sv. 
 
The measurable equivalence among the five performance measures was generated from 
the deliberation of decision makers and literature research, as shown in Table 2-2.  From 
those measurable equivalence and the elicited utility functions, it is possible to assess a 
set of normalized PM weights that express the relative importance of PMs. 
Table 2-2. Measurable Equivalence 
Performance Measure 
Cost Public Dose 
External 
Attention 
Worker 
Dose 
Industrial 
Accident 
Measurable 
Equivalence Source 
• •    222,000€ ≈ 1Sv NUREG/BR-0184 US NRC, 1997 
   • • 7Sv ≈ 1 Fatality Cember, 1992 
•    • 1 Fatality ≈ 2E6€ Collected Information 
•    • 1 Major Injury ≈ 2E5€ Burke, Aldrich, and Rasmussen, 1984 
  •  • Fatality > Inspection Deliberation 
 
For minor incident decision analysis, the five PM weights are presented in Table 2-1, and 
have been used in MIDAS analysis. 
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2.6 Risk-Informed Analysis 
The performance of a decision option is evaluated through an analysis mechanism to 
extract the utility value on each performance measure.  The analysis is a risk-informed 
analysis, as presented in Figure 2-2. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. The Value Tree with Analysis Used in MIDAS 
 
The Scenario Information block, shown in the right hand side of Analysis of Figure 2-2, 
provides the information, including the name of failed component and the time to next 
outage, which is obtained by decision analysts who just face an incident.  That 
information is supplied to the Decision Options block to decide which decision options 
are applicable to the incident of interest, as well as supplied to the Plant Model block as 
model parameters to construct the structure of analyses, which is a decision tree.  From 
the Decision Options block, every available decision option is provided to the Plant 
Model block to be analyzed. 
 
Due to the nature of minor incident decision problem, the presence of failed component 
and different plant states definitely change the plant safety condition.  Therefore, the risk 
information from plant PSA model is necessary to this analysis.  The PSA block, in the 
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left hand side of Analysis, supplies risk data (initiating event frequencies and conditional 
core damage probabilities) of various potential initiating events with respect to different 
plant states, as shown in Table 2-3, to the Plant Model block to performance safety-
related analysis, such as the impact to “Public Dose” and “Cost”. 
Table 2-3. A Typical PSA Data Table Used in MIDAS 
 State A State B State C State C 
IE 
Families Frequency CCDP Frequency CCDP Frequency CCDP Frequency CCDP 
APRP 2.94E-03 6.14E-04 2.44E-02 4.26E-03 4.49E-01 1.53E-04 2.65E-03 1.99E-02
ATWS 7.68E+00 1.86E-07       
PSF 1.31E-04 3.01E-03 3.02E-02 2.32E-04 3.67E-04 6.45E-04 1.13E-04 8.98E-05
PSL 6.72E-01 1.10E-06 6.72E-01 4.26E-06 6.72E-01 3.72E-07 6.72E-01 4.29E-06
RTE 1.25E-03 7.11E-04 1.25E-03 9.12E-04     
RTGV 1.60E-02 3.34E-05 1.38E-02 2.38E-05 6.27E-03 3.99E-07   
RTV 4.21E-03 2.11E-04 1.03E-02 1.09E-04     
TGTA 6.98E-01 7.50E-08 6.98E-01 7.50E-08     
TRCP 3.91E-02 7.10E-06 3.62E+00 2.58E-08 5.67E-02 5.12E-05 1.54E-01 7.25E-05
 
From the above description of the analysis mechanism lain below value tree, it can be 
observed that the Plant Model block is the place that actual analysis and calculations are 
performed.  Other blocks are in charge of providing necessary data.  There are some 
specific analysis models implemented in MIDAS for performing these tasks.  Those 
analysis models and other practices are described in next Chapter. 
 
2.7 Performance Index 
After an option’s performance is analyzed, the expected utility value for each PM from 
that option’s impact can be obtained.  Those utility values are then combined together to 
obtain a Performance Index (PI) following the formula in Eq. 2-1, which is the sum of the 
weighted expected utility values from each PM.  This equation is based on the 
assumption that the PMs are additive independent [4,5]. 
jjjjWj
N
i
ijij uwuwuwuwNuwuwPI 5544332211
1
][ +++⋅+== ∑
=
  (Eq. 2-1) 
where 
PIj Performance index for the j-th option, 
wi The weight of i-th PM, 
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N Total number of PMs, which is 5, 
NW The number of workers performing the repair, 
iju  The expected utility of the i-th PM with respect to j-th option, 
j The index of decision option, 
i The index of PM, as presented in Table 2-1. 
 
Performance index indicates the performance of a decision option on the basis of tradeoff 
among PMs, that is, decision makers’ objectives and preferences, and is used to rank and 
compare decision options.  In MIDAS, the decision option with lowest PI is the best one. 
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Chapter 3 MIDAS Models and Analyses 
 
A wide spectrum of minor incidents could occur within a nuclear power plant that caused 
by failure of one or more components, or are equipment inspection, maintenance or test.  
Following an incident, the plant faces different possible options to solve or mitigate the 
incident, including shutdown the plant and repair, on-line repair, or continue to operate as 
normal condition until next reactor outage to completely fix the failure.  The type of 
available options depends on the environmental conditions (plant state, type of failed 
component, time left to next planned outage). 
 
To be able to deal with the inherent diversity of incidents, scenarios and their resolving 
options, a generic plant model and a generic option/scenario model have been developed 
based on the utility company’s 1300Mwe PWR plant PSA analysis models.  Some 
assumptions and simplifications are made in those analysis models.  As a decision 
analysis tool, MIDAS has some handy functions that facilitate users to perform various 
analyses.  Those will be described in this chapter and Appendix I. 
 
3.1 Plant Model 
Plant model describe the current state of the plant.  They are important in modeling plant 
behavior.  MIDAS models a nuclear power plant in five plant states, which are the 
standard reactor states, defined for the PSA model [3], as shown in Table 3-1. 
 
In some studies or actual operation, each state may be further broken down.  However, in 
MIDAS analysis, only the principal states are considered.  Because all substates use the 
same PSA data of their principal state, they are indifference from analyst’s point of view.  
State a1 is separated from state a, as for some initiating events, such as ATWS, the risks 
to the reactor depend on the initial power level. 
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Table 3-1. Plant States 
State Description 
State a1 Reactor at power 
State a Reactor at hot shutdown (hot zero power) 
State b Reactor shutdown on steam generators 
State c Reactor shutdown on RHRS, RCS full, closed and vented 
State d RCS partially drained or open 
State e Refueling cavity full at least one fuel element in the vessel 
 
3.2 Initiating Event Families 
An initiating event is any event from which an accident sequence may develop.  
Assessment of core damage risk is based on the determination of all initiating events.  In 
the PSA model, nine categories (called “families” in MIDAS terminology) of internal 
initiating events are considered, as shown in Table 3-2.  The acronyms of IE family 
names in Table 3-2 are used throughout MIDAS. 
Table 3-2. Initiating Event Family 
IE Family Description 
1 – APRP Loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) 
2 – ATWS Anticipated transient without scram 
3 – PSF Loss of heat sink 
4 – PSL Loss of offsite power 
5 – RTE Secondary water line rupture 
6 – RTGV Steam generator tube rupture 
7 – RTV Steam line break 
8 – TGTA Secondary side transient 
9 – TRCP Primary side transient 
 
At any plant state except state e (cold shutdown), it is possible that occur an initiating 
event belonging to an IE family of those nine ones, and under this condition, an accident 
could be developed if that IE is not arrested.  The potential occurrence of initiating events 
and accidents at a given plant state has been modeled as a decision tree, as that one 
presented in Figure 3-1.  Actually it is not a “decision tree”, but a “chance tree”, because 
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there is not a decision node.  This decision tree is regarded as a module in MIDAS 
calculation.  It describes the plant as an aleatory model.  A complicated scenario can be 
composed of several modules to dictate the complex probabilistic property of the plant 
dynamic behavior. 
Accident develops
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Figure 3-1. The Decision Tree for the Plant at Any Plant State 
 
The chance nodes represent the dynamic behavior of the plant and the terminal nodes 
represent the termination of the scenario and the expected outcomes (i.e. utility to PMs) 
associated with the sequence.  In case an IE happens and an accident sequence develops, 
the safety system should be activated to arrest the accident before the reactor core is 
damaged.  Related to the utility calculation at terminal nodes, three kinds of outcomes in 
terminal nodes are worth to be described in details: 
 
1. If an IE happens but the developing accident is stopped and no core damage induced, 
the consequence impacts three PMs: Cost, Public Dose and External Attention.  The 
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impact depends on the type of IE and is listed in Table 3-3.  The utility values to these 
three PMs can be calculated by linear interpolating utility functions. 
Table 3-3. Expected Performance Measure Outcomes for IE Families 
Initiating 
Event 
Families 
Estimated 
Cost 
(1E6 €) 
External Attention
Public 
Dose 
(Sv) 
APRP 55 Long shutdown 0.2 
ATWS 12 Formal Notice  
PSF 12 Formal Notice  
PSL 2.4 Inspection  
RTE 40 Long shutdown  
RTGV 40 Formal Notice 0.133 
RTV 40 Long shutdown  
TGTA 0.3 Report  
TRCP 0.3 Report  
 
2. If an IE happens and the accident is not stopped, the reactor core is supposed damaged.  
All of the resulting utilities for every PM are set to unity, that is, the worst condition is 
resulted. 
3. No any IE happens.  Then, only three PMs: Cost (if no power generated, downtime 
cost should be taken into account), Worker Dose (if repair performed) and Industrial 
Accident (if repair performed) are affected.  This is the branch that lies in the bottom 
of the decision tree. 
 
There are two kinds of risk numerical data associated with initiating event in the event 
probability calculations.  They are 
1. Initiating Event Frequency (1/year), and 
2. Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP). 
Those data not only depend on IE family, but also on plant state, and the presence of 
failed component.  They are calculated from plant PSA model, and are called “PSA data” 
in MIDAS terminology.  A typical PSA data table is presented in Table 2-3. 
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The probability of an IE occurrence depends on the current plant state and the time stayed 
at that state.  The probability that no any IE happens is expressed in Eq. 3-1. 
∑= − TieP λ0          (Eq. 3-1) 
where 
λi the frequency of the i-th IE family 
T the time spent at that plant state 
 
And the conditional probability of i-th IE occurrence given that an IE has occurred is 
expressed as below 
∑= iiiP λ
λ          (Eq. 3-2) 
 
Eq. 3-2 is based on the fact that any one IE occurrence will bring the decision tree to a 
specified IE terminal node, thus there is only one IE should be considered happening in 
the period of mission time, T. 
 
From these two equations, the IE frequencies are translated into the probability of IE 
occurrence.  The probability of core damage is calculated by multiplying the probability 
Pi with CCDPi, which is the probability of core damage under the condition that the i-th 
IE happens.  Those probability data, as well as the resulting utilities at terminal nodes, are 
used to calculate the expected utility of a module with respect to certain PM.  This 
calculation was modulized and is the basis of MIDAS analysis, which consists of 
scenario calculation involving multiple plant states, sensitivity analysis and uncertainty 
analysis. 
 
3.3 Decision Option Model 
The incidents that could happen in a nuclear power plant are inherently diverse, and so 
are their remedial options.  However, they can be classified into several categories.  In 
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MIDAS decision option model, available options for any incident are of three different 
types, as shown graphically in Figure 3-2.  They are: 
1. Continue As Is 
2. On-line Repair 
3. Shutdown and Repair 
 
For convenience, they are also called “Type 1,” “Type 2,” and “Type 3” options in 
MIDAS terminology.  The term “repair” is used here for generality referring to the 
adapted remedial action performed on the component of interest, including real repair to 
fix a failure, maintenance, inspection or testing. 
 
 
Figure 3-2. Decision Option Types 
 
In Figure 3-2, the horizontal lines are option lines and are moving from left to right 
representing the progress of time.  The vertical variation of an option line represents the 
variation of power level.  The left-end vertical line means onset of the incident, while the 
right-end one is the time of next outage. 
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3.3.1 Continue As Is 
The plant will continue operate to generated power with no maintenance or repair 
performed until the next outage.  This option is available only for those incidents that it is 
technically possible (according to Technical Specification) and that do not pose an 
immediate threat to plant safety.  For instance, for a steam generator tube leak incident, if 
the leak rate is within the prescribed limit, it is allowed to operate without repair. 
 
MIDAS models the plant behavior by considering the existence of the failed component 
under normal power-generating operation.  The decision tree of this option is just the one 
shown in Figure 3-1, but the plant state is at state a1. 
 
3.3.2 On-line Repair: 
The plant will continue to produce power while an “on-line” repair is performed on the 
failed component.  This option is available only for those scenarios in which this is 
technically possible  (according to Technical Specification).  Due to the nature of this 
type of maintenance, there is a non-negligible probability that the maintenance does not 
succeed (probably can not finished in the allowed time) or that an automated shutdown 
(trip) of the plant will happen. 
 
If this on-line repair fails but the plant does not trip, it is necessary to shutdown the plant 
(through a prescribed procedure) and perform repair on the failed component.  To model 
those behaviors, MIDAS takes into account those probabilities during the analysis. 
 
In the decision tree for this option, Figure 3-3, the top branch represents that the repair is 
successful, which the probability is p and the plant state is at state a1 with failed 
component.  However, there is a possibility of IE occurrence during the repair time.  
After the repair time, the plant still stays at state a1, but without failed component.  
Behind the successful on-line repair module, there should be a decision module 
represents continuing operation, but it is omitted. 
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The bottom branch represents the chance that reactor trip due to the on-power repair.  The 
probability is assigned p’ and only one IE is considered happen in this condition.  Usually 
the IE is modeled as a primary side transient.  It is assumed that no time is involved in 
this branch – the IE is happened with probability p’ and consider the accident 
development with CCDP. 
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Figure 3-3. Decision Tree for "On-line Repair" Option 
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The middle branch of Figure 3-3 represents the chance of failing to repair or not being 
able finish the repair within allowed time, but doesn’t trip the reactor.  The probability is 
1-p-p’.  The plant is required to shutdown to fix the incident.  Corresponding to the 
prescribed shutdown sequence, there should be a series of decision modules, follow the 
repair module, and represent the different plant states in the shutdown sequence.  The 
shutdown sequence is the same as that described in next section, the Shutdown and 
Repair option.  It is assured that the plant starts the shutdown sequence from the end of 
allowed repair time. 
 
3.3.3 Shutdown and Repair: 
The plant is shutdown to a repair state, where the maintenance is performed.  It is 
supposed that this kind of repair is always successful, if no IE happens.  Following the 
repair the plant is taken back to the state of power production until the next outage.  
MIDAS models all the transition through different plant states from power production to 
the repair state and then back to power. 
 
The decision tree for this option is shown in Figure 3-4.  Only under the condition that no 
IE happens in a module (state), the plant can be brought to the next module (state). 
 
As shown in Figure 3-2, the performances of these three types of options have to take 
into account the final outage contribution.  In the final outage, no matter what the option 
is adapted, the reactor is shutdown following the prescribed shutdown sequence.  
However, the difference among three options is that the plant condition is with failed 
component for “Continue As Is” option, while normal plant condition for other two 
options.  Thus, for “Continue As Is” option, the risk is higher than the other two, during 
final outage shutdown.  Therefore, taking this final outage credit will generate different 
results in decision option analysis.  In fact, MIDAS provides the option to turn off/on 
taking the final outage credit in calculation. 
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Figure 3-4. Decision Tree for "Shutdown and Repair" Option 
 
To consistently compare the different types of options, the analysis is performed on a 
common time frame, which is from the beginning of the incident occurred until the next 
planned outage for all option types. 
 
The input data needed for MIDAS in analyzing those decision options is described in 
Appendix I, User’s Manual.  The technical details about module calculation are presented 
in Appendix II, Programmer’s Manual. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
Simulating the plant behavior using decision trees, MIDAS is able to perform three 
different types of analysis to enable the user to gain insights in the decision problem and 
to better evaluate the different options.  The three types of analysis performed are: 
1. Point analysis, 
2. Sensitivity analysis, 
3. Uncertainty analysis. 
 
 37
The detailed description about the implementation and operation of those analysis types 
is presented Appendices I and II. 
 
3.4.1 Point-Estimate Calculation 
The simplest analysis that can be performed is the so-called “point-estimate calculation”.  
A point-estimate for the expected PI of every option is calculated to obtain a ranking 
among options.  No uncertainties are modeled in this kind of calculation and the median 
values of the model parameters (PSA data, repair durations, worker dose, etc.) are used. 
 
The PI values are obtained using the median values for every model parameter.  The 
result represents a typical trend for those available options. 
 
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
MIDAS decision analysis model relies on the knowledge of parameters of the nuclear 
power plant and PSA data.  Information related to these parameters impacts calculations 
throughout the decision model.  These parameters have epistemic uncertainties 
associated. 
 
After finishing the point estimate decision analysis, a ranking of the whole set of 
available decision options can be obtained.  This resulting rank depends on the given 
typical model parameters.  Decision analysts would like to understand which PM or 
model parameters dominate these results, whether the decision model reflects the reality 
and what happen if the inherent uncertainties associated with the model parameters are 
included.  Through sensitivity analysis and uncertainty analysis, the prototype will 
provide answers to these questions. 
 
A one-way sensitivity analysis is performed on the user-selected uncertain model 
parameters.  Each uncertain parameter is varied between its user-designated extreme 
(lower and upper) values.  The results from the analysis are presented in the form of 
tornado diagrams, where the parameters are ranked according to the degree to which they 
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affect the final result, which is the optimal PI value.  This enables the user to find what 
are the most important model parameters to the final results and are worth to be analyzed 
in the uncertainty analysis. 
 
Table 3-4 lists the model parameters considered in MIDAS sensitivity and uncertainty 
analyses and their distribution.  In fact, only PSA data are modeled as lognormal 
distributions. 
 
Table 3-4. Parameters Considered in MIDAS Sensitivity/Uncertainty Analyses and 
Their Distribution 
Parameter type Name Uncertainty distribution 
PM weights Uniform 
Downtime cost Uniform Model 
IE Outcomes (Cost) Uniform 
Decision Option Time to next outage Uniform 
Repair probabilities Uniform 
Worker dose Uniform 
Duration Uniform 
On-line repair 
Industrial accident data Uniform 
Worker dose Uniform 
Duration Uniform Shutdown repair 
Industrial accident data Uniform 
IE frequency  Log-normal PSA data 
CCDP Log-normal 
 
3.4.3 Uncertainty Analysis 
Uncertainty analysis is like a computerized simulation.  Each user-selected parameter is 
modeled by the distribution that describes the degree of belief associated with it that is 
presented in Table 3-4.  The value of each modeled parameter is sampled randomly from 
their distributions.  Then, the PIs and the ranks are computed.  A large number of 
calculations are performed (so called Monte Carlo sampling) in order to achieve 
statistical significant final results.  In this way, it will be possible to obtain a distribution 
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of the expected PI for each option and also to quantify the confidence level on their 
ranking. 
 
3.5 Knowledge Base 
All of the relevant data used by MIDAS operation are stored in a knowledge base.  The 
knowledge base contains all of the necessary default information about the failed 
component/event, the PSA data, the PM weights and the utility functions to perform the 
decision analysis.  While MIDAS is modeling and analyzing a minor incident scenario, it 
accesses the knowledge base automatically to get the necessary data in a transparent way 
for the user.  Therefore, users should prepare and maintain the knowledge base regarding 
to specific incident before using MIDAS. 
 
The main advantage of knowledge base is that almost all adjustable parameters used in 
MIDAS are stored there, and provide the maximum flexibility for users to change 
MIDAS models.  It makes MIDAS useful for different decision makers or decision 
problems.  The only thing that embedded in MIDAS source and cannot be changed is the 
set of performance measures, which is the product of value tree. 
 
3.6 Assumptions and Simplifications 
It is difficult to take into account all of the factors that influence plant condition in 
performing risk-informed decision making for a nuclear power plant.  In addition, the 
purpose of the development of MIDAS is to implement and demonstrate a generic 
algorithm for incident decision analysis.  Therefore, some assumptions and 
simplifications are inevitable designed with MIDAS to facilitate the analysis.  The 
following text describes some major assumptions and simplifications that are also parts of 
MIDAS models. 
1. All incidents are assumed occurring while the plant is producing power (state a1).  
Thus, a scenario is well defined when the component of interest and the amount of 
time to next outage are given. 
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2. All plant substates are considered the same with their principal state.  The same set of 
PSA data are used for the plant substates belonging to a principal plant state.  In other 
words, substate d1 and substate d2 are indifferent from analysts’ point of view. 
3. Use the same set of PSA data for state a1 (at power) and state a (hot zero power).  
Usually that is not true, because for some initiating events the risks to the reactor 
depend on the initial power level. 
4. PSA data (initiating event frequencies and CCDPs) depend on the following three 
factors only: 
(a) current plant state, 
(b) the category of initiating event, 
(c) whether the component of interest is at normal condition or not. 
That is, PSA data are independent of scenario, plant history and other environmental 
factors. 
5. Only nine families of internal initiating events are considered. 
6. External events are ignored. 
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Chapter 4 Case Studies 
 
Two case studies were analyzed using MIDAS for demonstrating the procedure of 
incident decision analysis and the insight could be obtained from the results of analyses.  
For those scenarios, the data used were from either the 1300MWe PER PSA model [3] or 
personal communication with the utility company’s managers and engineers. 
 
4.1 Case Study 1 – Inspection of Suspected Leak on A Steam 
Generator Tube 
4.1.1 Description of the problem 
A 1300MW P4 unit has experienced a peak of radioactivity on the secondary coolant 
system and the experts agree to shut the unit down for inspection of the tube bundle of 
one of the four steam generators.  The unit has to stay at hot zero power holding phase for 
a few days while the inspection is prepared. 
 
The two possible choices for this holding phase are: 
1. Normal shutdown with cooling by steam generators, in readiness for connection of 
the Residual Heat Removal system (plant state b4) 
2. Normal shutdown with cooling by Residual Heat Removal system (at T = 60°C), with 
the four primary coolant pump running (plant state c3). 
 
The transition sequences and durations from state a1 to either state b4 or c3 are listed in 
Table 4-1. 
 
Then the plant is brought to mid-loop operation, with the fuel rods in the reactor, to insert 
plugs in the suspected steam generator, and to inspect the steam generator tube bundle in 
a fallback state that remains to be determined. 
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Table 4-1. 1300MW P4 Plant State Transition Sequence and Durations 
Transition Initial state 
Final 
state 
Intermediate 
states Transition and substate durations 
1 a1 c3 a2, a3, b1, 
b2, b3, b4 
At power (substate a1 to substate a3) = 2 hours
From substate a3 to substate b4 = 6 hours 
From substate a3 to substate c3 = 14 hours 
2 a1 b4 a2, a3, b1, 
b2, b3 
At power (substate a1 to substate a3) = 2 hours
From substate a3 to substate b4 = 6 hours 
3 c3 d1 none There is a need to wait around 80 hours after 
hot shutdown (a3) before the opening of the 
primary system (substate d1) 
4 c3 d2 d1 From d1 to d2 = 3 hours 
5 c3 e d1, d2 From d1 to d2 = 3 hours 
From d2 to e = 27 hours 
6 b4 d1 c1, c2, c3 There is a need to wait around 80 hours after 
hot shutdown (a3) before the opening of the 
primary system (substate d1) 
7 b4 d2 c1, c2, c3, 
d1 
From d1 to d2 = 3 hours 
8 b4 e c1, c2, c3, 
d1, d2 
From d1 to d2 = 3 hours 
From d2 to e = 27 hours 
9 d1 a1 d2, c3, c2, 
c1, b4, b3, 
b2, b1, a3, 
a2 
From d1 to a1 = approx. 7 days + 3 hours  
From d1 to d2 = 3 hours 
From d2 to c3 = around 34 hours 
From c3 to b4 = around 48 hours 
From b4 to a3 = 12 hours 
10 d2 a1 c3, c2, c1, 
b4, b3, b2, 
b1, a3, a2 
From d2 to a1 = approxi. 7 days  
From d2 to c3 = around 34 hours 
From c3 to b4 = around 48 hours 
From b4 to a3 = 12 hours 
11 e a1 d2, c3, c2, 
c1, b4, b3, 
b2, b1, a3, 
a2 
From e to a1 = approxi. 9 days (216 hours) 
From e to d2 = around 40 hours 
From d2 to c3 = around 34 hours 
From c3 to b4 = around 48 hours 
From b4 to a3 = 12 hours 
 
The inspections will last about 12 days.  The residual heat is supposed to be quite high.  
One steam generator will have plugs installed (water boxes empty), and the other three 
steam generators will not be opened.  
 
The three possible states for steam generator inspection are: 
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1. Refueling shutdown with the reactor vessel open – reactor cavity full – fuel rods in 
reactor vessel (plant state e, the risk of core melt is assumed to be negligible) 
2. Shutdown for repair – pressurizer manway open – water level just below pressurizer 
manway level – primary coolant circuit full, except for the top of the steam generator 
(plant state d1) 
3. Shutdown for repair – pressurizer manway open – water level at vessel-to-cavity seal 
ring (plant state d2) 
 
After the inspection, the reactor should be brought to full power operation state (state a1).  
The transition sequences and durations from the holding phase (state b4 or c3) to 
inspection state (state d1, d2 or e) and return to power (state a1) are listed in Table 4-1. 
 
4.1.2 Determination of Available Options and Key Model Parameters 
For this case study, the first step is to determine available decision options.  Obviously, 
the plant should be shutdown for inspection, thus “Continue-As-Is” and “On-Line 
Repair” options are not relevant.  Only “Shutdown and Repair” option should be 
considered.  However, the sequence of “Shutdown and Repair” option modeled in 
MIDAS, as described in Section 3.3.3, is: 
1. Shutdown the reactor to the repair state following a prescribed sequence, 
2. Perform repair at the repair state, 
3. Bring the reactor back to normal power operation state. 
There is not a design of “holding phase” during plant state transition in MIDAS 
“Shutdown and Repair” option.  In addition, in this case study, there are more than one 
possible shutdown sequences, which compose various possible decision options. 
 
MIDAS provides the function to specify multiple prescribed transition sequences for 
shutdown and return-to-power transitions.  The time spent in holding phase can be 
regarded as the time needed at the specified state.  Because all substates are considered 
the same with their principal state, the repair states d1 and d2 are indifferent, even though 
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3 hours is needed to transit from state d1 to state d2.  According to Table 4-1, “there is a 
need to wait around 80 hours after hot shutdown (a3) before the opening of the primary 
system (substate d1).”  Therefore, 80-hour is used to be the time (“a few days”) needed in 
the holding phase.  Transition from state d to state e obviously needs 27 hours.  As a 
result, the shutdown sequences input in knowledge base as Table Repair_state is listed in 
Table 4-2.  A description of the format of knowledge base tables is presented in Chapter 
6 of Appendix I. 
Table 4-2.  Table Repair_state for Case Study 1 
ID Final Number a b c d 
1 d 3 6 77 3  
2 e 4 6 77 3 27 
3 d 3 6 8 72  
4 e 4 6 8 72 27 
 
In Table 4-2, the first and second rows represent the options that hold at state b4 while 
the other rows are the options that hold at state c3.  The first and third rows represent the 
options that repair at state e, while the second and fourth rows are repaired at state d. 
 
According to Table 4-1, the return-to-power sequence specified in knowledge base as 
Table Back_to_power is set as listed in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3. Table Back_to_power for Case Study 1 
ID Repair_state Number d c b a 
1 d 3  34 48 12 
2 e 4 40 34 48 12 
 
The risk increased due to the presence of the failed component is hard to estimate, partly 
because the steam generator tube leak is “suspected”.  An assumption was made that only 
the frequency of the initiating event – steam generator tube rupture (RTGV) – increases 
due to the presence of suspected SG tube leak, and the amount of incensement is assumed 
400% of nominal values.  This is an estimate and can be verified later in uncertainty 
analysis. 
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The daily economic loss due to no electricity generation is set as 300000€, which is the 
downtime cost. 
 
Two workers should be involved to perform the repair and subject to radiological expose.  
The worker dose from the repair is 0.01Sv per person at state d or 0.035Sv per person at 
state e.  The repair duration is 12 days (288 hours). 
 
The frequency of industrial accident that could be caused from the repair and induce 
worker casualty is 0.0001(1/hour).  Once an industrial accident happens, there is a chance 
of 1% that the wounded worker will die.  That is, the conditional probability of worker 
fatality given an industrial accident has happened is 1%.  On the other hand, the fraction 
of major injury is 10%, while the fraction of minor injury is 89%. 
 
The time to next outage was not specified in the description of problem.  An estimated 5 
months (3600 hours) is used in the point calculation. 
 
Other tables in the knowledge base are those about utility functions, PM weights and IE 
outcomes.  They are set according to the data on Table 2-1 and Table 3-3. 
 
4.1.3 Analyses and Results 
After input the necessary data for this case study to MIDAS, the Decision Option window 
appears, as presented in Figure 4-1.  This window is useful in checking the input data.  
There are four options presented on the option list. 
 
The point calculation was performed and the results are listed in Table 4-4.  The number 
in the parentheses below the name of PM is the PM weight.  The numbers in the 
parentheses below the utility values of PMs indicate the fractional contribution to the 
total PI.  Because the utility used in MIDAS is actually “disutility,” the lower the value of 
PI is, the better the option is.  Therefore, the best option in point calculation is the first 
option from the results -- hold at state b and repair at state d, which has the lowest PI. 
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Figure 4-1.  The Decision Option Window of Case Study 1 
 
Table 4-4.  Point Calculation Results for Case Study 1 
        
Options Total PI 
Cost 
(0.450)
External 
Attention
(0.270) 
Public 
Dose 
(0.270)
Industrial 
Accident
(0.0087)
Worker 
Dose 
(0.00045) 
Core 
Damage 
Probability
Hold at b, repair at d 2.29E-2 4.77E-2(0.937)
4.67E-3
(0.055) 
3.08E-5
(0.0004)
1.24E-3
(0.0004)
2.70E-1 
(0.005) 6.23E-6 
Hold at b, repair at e 2.33E-2 4.86E-2(0.939)
4.74E-3
(0.055) 
4.36E-5
(0.0005)
1.24E-3
(0.0005)
2.70E-1 
(0.005) 6.05E-6 
Hold at c, repair at d 2.55E-2 5.24E-2(0.925)
4.53E-3
(0.023) 
2.94E-5
(0.0003)
1.24E-3
(0.0004)
1.35 
(0.023) 4.69E-6 
Hold at c, repair at e 2.59E-2 
5.33E-2
(0.926)
4.60E-3
(0.048) 
4.22E-5
(0.0004)
1.24E-3
(0.0004)
1.35 
(0.023) 
4.47E-6 
 
From the results of point calculation, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. The best option, the first option, has the lowest value of total PI but the greatest risk 
(core damage probability) that is also shown in the lower-left diagram of PI plot in 
Figure 4-2.  For this case study, the option with lower PI value has high risk.  If the 
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risk attitude of decision makers is strongly risk-aversion, the final decision made 
might be not the first option.  In fact, the final decision should be made after 
considering the uncertainty and a deliberation process with decision makers. 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  PI plot for Point Calculation in Case Study 1 
2. For all options, Cost has the overwhelmingly fraction of contribution to the total PI.  
Thus, the economic factor is the deciding driving factor in this case study.  Decision 
makers can even made the decision based only on the economic performance 
provided they are risk-neutral. 
3. Although Worker Dose has large value of resulting utility, its weight is too small 
(0.00045) and makes its influence trivial.  Actually it is resulted from the design of 
MIDAS that considers and accommodates large number of workers. 
4. The performances of first and second options are close, and so for third and fourth 
ones.  Thus the impact of the selection of holding state is stronger than that of the 
selection of repair state. 
5. Basically the calculated PI values are close, thus the uncertainty analysis should be 
performed to further evaluate those decision options. 
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The next step of decision analysis is performing sensitivity analysis to find out the 
important model parameters to the final results.  Because of the conclusion that Cost is 
the most important driving factor, the selection of model parameters to do sensitivity 
analysis can be focused on those related to Cost, such as IE cost outcomes, downtime 
cost, mission time at repair state, time to next outage and PSA data.  Due to the inherent 
limitation of MIDAS design, only the duration of repair state can be varied in sensitivity 
and uncertainty study, though the duration of holding phase is also important. 
 
In the following sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, the ranges (upper bound and lower 
bound) of selected parameters are determined based on following general rules: 
1. The PSA data were changed between 5th and 95th percentiles determined by error 
factor 3 from the median values, as lognormal distributions. 
2. The IE cost outcomes, time to next outage, time at repair state and downtime cost are 
changed between 150% and 50% of the mean values, as uniform distributions. 
 
 
Figure 4-3.  The Results of Sensitivity Analysis for Case Study 1 
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The results of sensitivity analysis are presented in Figure 4-3.  The first two important 
model parameters are Downtime Cost and repair duration of the fourth option.  Through 
sensitivity analysis, the first several important parameters to the option performances are 
identified.  Usually those parameters are selected to perform uncertainty analysis. 
 
The results of uncertainty analysis are presented in Figure 4-4.  The left panel displays 
the percentage that one option becomes the best option, while the right panel presents the 
distribution of the PI of selected option.  From the results, it can be observed that the first 
option has the probability of 85%±2% to be the best option.  The fourth option has some 
chance (14%±2%) to be the best option, because its repair duration has significant 
influence to the PI value, which has been identified in sensitivity analysis.  For the other 
two options, there is no any chance to be the best option. 
 
 
Figure 4-4.  The Results of Uncertainty Analysis for Case Study 1 
 
Therefore, obviously, from the results of this formal decision analysis, there is an 85% 
confidence level that decision makers can adopt the first option and it will have the best 
performance over other available options.  On the other hand, decision makers are also 
aware that second and third options will by no means be the best option. 
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4.2 Case Study 2 – Anchors of two steam lines not compliant 
4.2.1 Description of the problem 
When a 1300MW P4 unit was shut down, inspection of the integrity of the anchors 
securing the restraints of the main steam lines found two of the four lines to be non-
compliant.  The required replacement parts cannot be supplied before the unit has to be 
started up again. 
 
Two assumptions were made: 
1. In the event of a break on the main steam line, downstream of the main steam isolation 
valves, non-conformity of the anchors of a restraint on the line causes failure-to-close 
of the main steam isolation valve on the line concerned. 
2. The failure of the steam line would not have any effect on the second steam line with 
non-conform restraint anchors (no pipe whip on the line). 
 
Is it reasonable to operate for a full cycle with faulty anchors on the restraints of two 
main steam lines, or how long can unit start-up is delayed? 
 
4.2.2 Determination of Available Options and Key Model Parameters 
For this problem, the first step is to determine available decision options.  There are only 
two options specified by decision makers: 
1. Start-up the reactor and operate as normal, and 
2. Delay the reactor start-up after the outage for waiting for the replacement parts. 
 
Obviously, the first option is a “Continue-As-Is” option in MIDAS model, which is 
operated as normal with the failed components.  However, the second option is not 
exactly the “Shutdown and Repair” option as MIDAS expected, because there is not a 
“shutdown” process in the second option.  The initial condition of this problem is at a 
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plant outage, which is state e.  It is not compliant with the MIDAS option specification.  
MIDAS requires that all options be started from state a1. 
 
To resolve this problem, a trick was used.  For the first option, the “Continue-As-Is” 
model is used to simulate the full-power normal plant operation with failed components 
from the time point just after reactor start-up to next planned reactor outage.  For second 
option, it was simulated as a “Shutdown and Repair” option but the time spent in 
shutdown transition is zero.  That is, the reactor is shutdown from state a1 to state e 
immediately, at the starting point of this scenario.  The risk of state e is supposed 
negligible.  Using this trick imposes no risk on the reactor because no time is spent on 
plant states other than state e.  After a period of time waiting for the replacement parts, 
the reactor will start-up and operate as normal without failed component. 
 
As a result, the shutdown sequences input in knowledge base as Table Repair_state is 
listed in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5. Table Repair_state for Case Study 2 
ID Final Number a b c d 
1 e 4 0 0 0 0 
 
However, some points should be carefully considered.  In order to compare these two 
options, the time frames should be the same for both.  In the first option, undoubtedly, the 
operating time is the full cycle length.  However, for the second option, the operation 
time should be the full cycle length subtracted by the time waiting for the replacement 
parts.  This arrangement takes into account the credit that the second option suffers from 
the economic loss that no electricity production during the extended outage time, but 
benefits from the operation in a safer condition since then. 
 
Another important point should be noticed is that there is not a start-up simulation in the 
first option.  Actually it should be simulated, since the plant is transited to full power 
operation with failed components and no electricity generation during that period of start-
up.  Therefore, in order to fairly compare these two options, the second option also 
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removes the return-to-power phase by using the trick again that sets the time for each 
start-up transition state to zero.  Therefore, the return-to-power (start-up) sequence 
specified in knowledge base as Table Back_to_power is set as listed in Table 4-6. 
 
Table 4-6. Table Back_to_power for Case Study 2 
ID Repair_state Number d c b a 
1 e 4 0 0 0 0 
 
The only problem left is that the first option avoids the risk in start-up and the second 
option doesn’t take the credit from the safer condition during start-up.  It can be verified 
by a special MIDAS analysis and concludes that the affect of this simplification to the 
final PI values is minor, because the mission of start-up is short compared with full cycle 
length. 
 
The risk increased due to the presence of the failed components should be estimated.  The 
family of initiating events must be considered is only RTV (main steam line break).  RTV 
is possible to happen only at states a and b.  The occurrence of main steam line break is 
supposed independent from the presence of failed anchors, thus the frequencies of RTV 
keeps the same with normal condition.  However, once the break happens on the two 
main steam lines with failed anchors, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) will fail to 
close and significantly increase the conditional probability of core damage (CCDP).  It 
was estimated that the CCDPs was changed from a trivial value to 0.33, both at states a 
and b. 
 
The daily economic loss due to no electricity generation is set as 300000€, which is the 
downtime cost. 
 
Because the “repair” state is at state e for the second option, there is no any risk imposed 
from failed components.  On the other hand, during the period of waiting time, it is 
assumed that no worker is actually performing the “repair” and accordingly no worker 
dose and industrial accident will be happened. 
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The full cycle length is 18 months, which is 12960 hours.  The time of waiting for the 
replacement components was not specified in the description of problem.  An estimated 5 
days (120 hours) is used in the point calculation. 
 
Other tables in the knowledge base are those about utility functions, PM weights and IE 
outcomes.  They are set according to the data on Table 2-1 and Table 3-3. 
 
4.2.3 Analyses and Results 
After input the necessary data for this case study, the Decision Option window was 
obtained, as presented in Figure 4-5.  It is useful in checking the input data and expected 
decision option list.  There are two options presented on the option list. 
 
 
Figure 4-5.  The Decision Option Window of Case Study 2 
 
The point calculation was performed and the results are listed in Table 4-7.  The numbers 
in the parentheses below the utility values of PMs indicate the fractional contribution to 
the total PI.  Because the utility used in MIDAS is actually “disutility,” the lower value of 
PI, the better is the option.  Thus first option is better than second one. 
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Table 4-7.  Point Calculation Results for Case Study 2 
Options Total PI 
Cost 
(0.450)
External 
Attention
(0.270) 
Public 
Dose 
(0.270)
Industrial 
Accident
(0.0087)
Worker 
Dose 
(0.00045) 
Core 
Damage 
Probability
Continue As Is 1.29E-2 2.18E-2(0.760)
1.06E-2
(0.222) 
8.52E-4
(0.018)
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 8.26E-4 
Delayed Start-up 1.62E-2 3.01E-2(0.836)
9.76E-3
(0.163) 
2.97E-5
(0.001)
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 4.24E-6 
 
From the results of point calculation, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Similar to Case Study 1, the best option has the lowest value of total PI but the greatest 
risk, which is also shown in the PI plot, Figure 4-6. 
 
Figure 4-6.  PI plot for Point Calculation in Case Study 2 
2. Again, Cost has the most fraction of contribution to the total PI, but External Attention 
also has significant contribution.  That Cost and External Attention dominate the 
decision-making agrees with our experience of using MIDAS to do minor incident 
decision analysis.  That is because for minor incident, safety is not the first concern, 
while economic factor and public relationship are.  Therefore, though delaying start-up 
and replacing the failed anchors make the plant safer, the economic loss due to 
shortage in electricity generation makes this option undesirable. 
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3. It also reveals that safer plant condition (second option) makes good relation with 
regulators and the public, as the numbers shown in the column of External Attention.  
However, after tradeoff among other PMs (mainly Cost), second option becomes not 
the best option. 
4. Worker Dose and Industrial Accident have no any contribute to PI, because no actual 
repair is performed in both options. 
 
The next step is to perform sensitivity analysis to find out the important parameters to the 
final results.  Again, the selection of model parameters to do sensitivity study will be 
focused on Cost – IE cost outcomes, downtime cost, waiting time and PSA data.  
External Attention has nothing to do in sensitivity analysis.  The problem has specified 
the time to next outage, which is the full cycle length, thus it will not be analyzed. 
 
The ranges of selected parameters for sensitivity and uncertainty analyses are determined 
based on rules described in Section 4.1.3, except that the waiting time is changed 
between 3 days to 7 days. 
 
 
Figure 4-7.  The Results of Sensitivity Analysis for Case Study 2 
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The results of sensitivity analysis are presented in Figure 4-7.  The first three important 
parameters are related to PSA data but not to RTV.  All of those important parameters are 
selected to perform uncertainty analysis. 
 
The results of uncertainty analysis are presented in Figure 4-8 displaying the PI 
distributions of two options.  From the results, it can be observed that the first option 
(Continue as is) has the probability of 76%±2% to be the best option.  The second option 
has some chance (23%±2%) to be the best option. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8.  The Results of Uncertainty Analysis for Case Study 2 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
The risk-informed decision analysis methodology and various practical models 
implemented inside MIDAS have been described and explained in this thesis.  In 
addition, two different and interesting case studies have been analyzed and demonstrate 
the application of MIDAS. 
 
MIDAS is not a sophisticated risk analysis tool.  There are some assumptions and 
simplifications embedded in its models and analyses.  However, through MIDAS 
analyses, the important insight toward the performance of decision options and deciding 
factors can be clearly presented quantitatively. 
 
From the presented case studies and the experience gained from other minor incident 
analyses, usually safety is not the first concern in decision-making, while economic factor 
and public relationship are.  It is the result from decision makers’ preference among PMs 
toward minor incident management and the fact that usually risks resulted from incidents 
are much smaller than those from severe accidents.  In addition, the core-damage risks 
associated with options for resolving minor incidents are close and play minor role in 
decision-making.  It is an important insight obtained from MIDAS analysis.  However, in 
fact, the safety performance of each option is also reflected in terms of the cost and 
external attention. 
 
Although MIDAS is a formal analytic decision making advisory tool, it cannot replace 
the role of deliberation process, which should be held after formal decision analysis with 
decision makers and, if necessary, stakeholders.  The final decision should be made in the 
deliberation process. 
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1. Overview 
 
This manual provides the necessary information for using the MIDAS application 
package.  MIDAS is an acronym for Minor Incident Decision Analysis Software.  It 
implements the risk-informed decision-making and incident management methodology 
developed in the project “The Use of PSA to Support Operational Decision Making in 
Nuclear Power Plants,” which sponsored by Electricité de France (EdF). 
 
1.1. Introduction to MIDAS Applications 
 
There is a wide spectrum of minor incidents could occur within a nuclear power plant, 
ranged from preventive maintenance activities to minor failure repair for a variety of 
components.  There are several possible options could be adopted to approach the 
scenario of a minor incident, but each of them can provide a satisfactory solution only for 
some objectives.  Those objectives include worker safety, economic impact and publicity, 
which are concerned by plant managers. 
 
A risk-informed incident management methodology that uses multi-attribute utility 
theory (MAUT) and formal decision-making models was developed for nuclear power 
plants.  A specific value tree was created by negotiation to present the value and 
perception of the decision makers (EdF personnel) in minor incident management.  The 
performance measures in value tree are measurable parameters that express the degree of 
satisfaction for a specific means objective.  To quantify the degree of satisfaction, 
according to MAUT, a set of utility functions and weights was elicited for those 
performance measures.  Those value tree and utility functions are used throughout the 
analysis. 
 
To be able to deal with the inherent diversity of scenarios and decision options, a generic 
algorithm was also developed.  A set of well-defined option models and more modular 
structure were imbedded into the methodology. 
 
MIDAS is an implementation of the methodology and models described above.  Besides 
that, MIDAS has some convenient facilities that help users performing decision analyses.  
Those facilities include parameter sensitivity analysis, uncertainty analysis, visualized 
result presentation, and store/restart functions.  MIDAS is the incident management tool 
for nuclear power plants, which is designed to help plant managers, staff, supporting 
engineers, or operating engineers in assessing minor incidents or event scenarios and in 
making decisions. 
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1.2. System Requirements 
 
Hardware: PC with Pentium 133MHz-equivalence or higher processor with at least 
24 MB RAM 
System: Microsoft Windows 95/98/2000/XP or later version, with Microsoft ADO 
(ActiveX Data Object) interface.  ADO interface is automatically installed 
together with Microsoft Access 97 or higher. 
 
1.3. Software Features 
 
1.3.1. Programming Language 
 
MIDAS has been written in Microsoft Visual BASIC 6.0. 
 
1.3.2. On-Line Help 
 
MIDAS was designed to be self-explanatory and user-friendly.  Text Tip function has 
been utilized to provide users the convenience to get a quick hint.  When the user moves 
the mouse pointer onto an object and waits for one second, a small yellow tip label 
displaying a short description about the object functionality will appear.  For some 
functions, a more detailed explanation is accessible through a Help button. 
 
1.3.3. Program Limitations 
 
The following limitations have to be considered while setting up an analysis: 
 
1. The number of on-line repair options in a scenario should not exceed 9. 
2. The number of shutdown repair options in a scenario should not exceed 99. 
 
1.3.4. Typical Running Times 
 
The running time required to perform the different type of analysis depends on the 
computer platform used and is proportional to the number of options considered. 
 
A point-estimate calculation is usually performed within one second on any computer 
platform.  For sensitivity analysis, the running time depends on the number of uncertain 
parameters, but is usually performed within seconds.  The uncertainty analysis also 
depends on the number of parameters involved and the number of sampling.  This type of 
analysis can take up to several minutes, so, it is suggested that perform an uncertainty 
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analysis with a small number of samples (100 is the default value) and then increase the 
number until the desired level of precision is obtained. 
 
1.3.5. Code Documentation 
 
The documentation for MIDAS is composed of three parts: 
1. Source Code – comprehends the complete Visual Basic source code and form 
objects for further development of the application. 
2. User’s Manual – the manual you are reading.  It provides user the necessary 
information to begin using the software, prepare input data for new scenarios, and 
perform various of scenario analyses. 
3. Programmer’s Manual – this manual describes the MIDAS code from a 
programmer’s point of view, in order to enable the reader to obtain the ability of 
maintaining, modifying and developing the source code.   
 
1.4. Program Window Map 
 
MIDAS is a multi-window application.  During the operation of this software, there could 
be several windows opened on the computer screen.  To help the user understanding the 
organization of the whole program and the relationship between various windows, a 
window flow map was plotted in Figure 1. 
 
From the diagram, it can be observed that Decision Options Window serves as a de facto 
control center of MIDAS.  All analyses and information within MIDAS can be conducted 
or requested from Decision Options Window through its menu bar and command buttons.  
After the initial input of the required data, Decision Options Window is always open until 
the user quits MIDAS. 
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Figure 1 – MIDAS Window Flow Map 
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2. Getting Started 
 
2.1. Installation 
 
The program of MIDAS is distributed in the form of CD-ROM.  For the software to be 
working correctly, it is necessary to copy the following files to a specified working folder.  
Those files can be found at the folder /MIDAS on the MIDAS CD-ROM. 
 
1. midas.exe 
The main executable file of MIDAS. 
2. option_kb.mdb 
The Access database file containing the knowledge base information. 
3. component_name.txt 
The text files containing description for the given scenario (they are not necessary 
for the application to work correctly). 
4. *.ocx files 
They are necessary ActiveX files for running MIDAS. 
 
In addition, the folder /Manual on the MIDAS CD-ROM contains the Word files for 
User’s Manual and Programmer’s Manual.  The folder /code contains the source code of 
MIDAS, which was prepared for future maintainers and developers. 
 
2.2. Running MIDAS 
 
To start the application, simply double-click on the file midas.exe.  The introduction 
screen will appear and last for four seconds, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
2.2.1. Input the Required Data 
 
After waiting four seconds or clicking on the introduction screen, the Input Window will 
appear.  This is the first window of MIDAS in which the user is asked to input the 
necessary information to describe the scenario to be analyzed. 
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Figure 2 – Introduction Screen 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Input Window 
 
The user is asked to select the failed component from the scrolling list and input the 
number of hours left to the next planned outage.  The elements in the scrolling list are 
read from the knowledge base, which should be prepared before using MIDAS.  To 
prepare the knowledge base or to insert new scenarios into it, please refer to Section 6.2.2. 
Step-by-Step Procedure to Add a New Scenario. 
 
There are four buttons available to the user on this window.  Pressing the Quit button 
(available throughout all of the application) will end and exit MIDAS. 
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2.2.2. Scenario Description Window 
 
The Description button invokes a description about the selected failed component and 
scenario, as shown in Figure 4.  This description is contained in the text file 
component_name.txt, which component_name is the user-defined name for the 
selected component dictated in the knowledge base. The Restore button is used for 
restoring a previous saved model file, which is described in Section 3.6. Save and Restore 
the Settings.  When the OK button is pressed, a Description Window will appear and 
continue the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Description Window 
 
After selecting the failed component from the scrolling list and input the value (in hours) 
of the remaining time to the next outage, the user can click the OK button to submit the 
input.  Then the Input Window will disappear and a confirmation window, as shown in 
Figure 5, will show up before proceeding to the next step. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Input Confirmation Window 
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Upon confirmation, MIDAS will read all the relevant information about the selected 
failed component in the knowledge base and generate automatically a list of the most 
commonly available decision options. 
 
For certain values of time to next outage, not all of the suggested options are available.  If 
the time left to next outage is too small it is possible that some shutdown sequences 
cannot be completed.  In this case, the user will receive a warning message and will be 
asked whether he or she wants to change the input value or to proceed to the next step.  If 
the user confirms the input value, those options that are not valid based on the time to 
next outage will be automatically removed from the option list.  In case all of the possible 
options are not available due to short time to next outage, the user will be forced to re-
input the value of time to next outage. 
 
If the user chooses to load a previous saved model file through Restore button, after 
successfully restore the analysis model, MIDAS will move on to the next module. 
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3. Functions in the Decision Options Window 
 
3.1. Decision Options Window 
 
After completing the input procedure, the Decision Options Window will appear 
presenting a list of available decision options, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Decision Options Window 
 
Several functions are accessible to the users through buttons and menu.  The selected 
failed component and hours left to the next outage are displayed on the top of option list.  
If the user wants to modify these values, he or she can use the Back button to return to 
the previous Input Window to re-input these values.  A message box will appear for 
confirmation after pressing Back button, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Confirmation Window 
 
The decision options are listed and numbered.  Each option is described by a state 
transition sequence.  A description of the type of options and the associated data are 
presented in the following sections. 
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There are three types of options modeled in MIDAS: 
 
3.1.1. Continue As Is 
 
This option is to continually operate the plant at full power until the next outage time, 
without repairing the failed component.  The relative sequence will thus be to stay in state 
a1 (at-power) for the whole time left to the next outage.  This type of option is also called 
Type 1 Option. 
 
3.1.2. On-line Repair 
 
The failed component will be repaired while the plant is at-power (state a1).  The average 
duration of the repair is displayed in the first field of the transition sequence row (3 hours, 
in the example).  After being repaired successfully, the plant will keep producing power 
(state a1) for the remaining time to next outage (1997 hours, in the example).  There are 
some additional parameters describing this decision option that can be found by clicking 
on the Repair Info button.  This type of option is also called Type 2 Option. 
 
3.1.3. Shutdown and Repair 
 
This option consists of a sequence of states that the plant goes through during the 
shutdown phase and the successive back-to-power phase.  The transition sequence shows 
the different states and the time spent in each field.  As an example of taking option 3 in 
Figure 6, the transition sequence represents that the plant will be shutdown, and transits 
through state a (hot shutdown) for 6 hours, then waits for 8 hours in state b to remove 
decay heat, and then goes to state c.  In this state (state c), the repair will be performed.  It 
will last for 5 hours and then the sequence will continue until the plant is restored to at-
power (state a1) where it will stay for the remaining time (1921 hours) until the next 
outage.  There are some additional parameters describing this decision option that can be 
found by clicking on the Repair Info button.  This type of option is also called Type 3 
Option. 
 
3.2. Edit, Add and Delete Decision Options 
 
The option list contains only the most common options.  It is generated according to the 
information stored in the knowledge base, which was prepared in advance.  MIDAS 
allows the user to add new options, or edit and delete existing ones.  In the bottom of the 
window, there are three command buttons for these tasks: Edit, Add and Delete buttons.  
To edit or delete a option, select the option, and then click the corresponded button. 
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3.2.1. Edit a Decision Option 
 
When a repair option is selected the Edit button will become active.  Upon pressing the 
Edit button, a Edit Window will appear depending on the type of repair option that the 
user selected: on-line repair option or shutdown repair option.  It is not possible to edit a 
continue-as-is type of option because there are no parameters to edit in this case.  Thus, 
only repair options can be edited. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Edit Window – On-line Repair Option 
 
As seen in Figure 8, for an on-line repair option editing, it is possible to change the 
following items: 
 
1. The duration of the on-line repair, 
2. The probability of repair success, 
3. The probability of tripping the plant due to on-line repair, 
4. The type of the initiating event caused in case of trip, 
5. The worker dose during the on-line repair, 
6. The number of workers involved in the on-line repair, 
7. Industrial accident frequency (1/worker-hour), 
8. The fraction of major injuries, in case an industrial accident occurs, 
9. The fraction of fatalities, in case an industrial accident occurs, 
10. The shutdown state at which a repair is performed, if the repair is unsuccessful, 
11. The repair duration of the shutdown repair, if on-line repair is unsuccessful. 
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If the on-line repair fails but the plant does not trip, it is required to shutdown the plant 
and repairs the failed component.  The probability of this condition is: 
 
P(on-line repair fails, plant doesn’t trip) 
= 1 – P(on-line repair succeed) – P(plant trips) 
 
The original values are also displayed.  MIDAS will return a warning message if any 
inconsistent value has been input.  For instance, a negative value is inputted in the repair 
duration field. 
 
For the shutdown-and-repair type of option, a transition sequence referring to the current 
repair option will be presented on the Edit Window, as shown in Figure 9.  It will be 
possible to edit the repair duration, the transition durations and other relevant parameters 
shown on the window.  The duration time spent in the last plant state (a1, at-power) is 
automatically updated to keep consistency with the total available time. 
 
 
Figure 9- Edit Window – Shutdown Repair Option 
 
Notice that the showdown sequence and return-to-power sequence are fixed and specified 
in the knowledge base.  The only way to change the transition sequence is to change the 
repair state, that is, the state that pair performs at.  The way to change the repair state is 
clicking at the Change Repair State button.  A choice list will be pulled down, as shown 
in Figure 10.  After selecting the desired repair state from the list, the state transition 
sequence will be accordingly updated and the duration of each state will be reset to zero.  
The user can then input the actual duration values in the transition sequence table. 
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Figure 10 – Edit Window – Shutdown Repair Option – Repair State Selection 
 
3.2.2. Add a Decision Option 
 
The Add button allows the user to add a new option to the decision option list.  The user 
will be asked what type of option that he or she would like to add.  Because there can be 
only one Continue-as-is option, if there is already a Continue-as-is option on the option 
list, the Continue-as-is button on the Add Window will appears dim and inactive. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Add Window – Option Type Selection 
 
Upon selection, the Add Window and relative procedures are similar to the previously 
described Edit Window, except that for adding an on-line repair option, only the column 
for new values is displayed. 
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3.2.3. Delete a Decision Option 
 
To delete a decision option, select the option to be deleted and press the Delete button.  A 
confirmation window will appear for preventing deleting an option by mistake. 
 
3.3. Repair Info 
 
To obtain additional information about the selected repair option, use the Repair Info 
button.  This will open the Repair Information window to get a quick view of the data 
about the selected repair option. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Repair Information Window 
 
3.4. Print Report 
 
The Print Report button enables the user to print a list of current decision options and 
their parameters to a selected printer or to save this information on a file.  In MIDAS, 
Print Report is the only way to output the results of an analysis to a readable and 
preservable form.  Thus, after elaborate modification and tuning for the decision options, 
besides using Save/Restore to save the work into a model file for further analysis, Print 
Report is a good way to output the work to a readable report. 
 
Pressing the Print Report button on Decision Options Window, a text editor will appear 
filled with all the relevant information, as shown in Figure 13.  The information consists 
of the following items: 
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1. The name of failed component, 
2. Time to next outage, 
3. Parameters specified in each decision option. 
 
Print Report Window is a RTF editor.  RTF stands for Rich Text Format, which is a 
standard way for storing information along with text.  Thus, RTF editor provides those 
capabilities beyond a plain text editor does, including mixing different fonts, sizes, colors 
and attributes (bold, italic and underline).  Actually, a RTF editor has basic text-
manipulation functions that a word processor has.  The functions and ability of RTF 
editors are between those of plain text editors and full-functioned word processors. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Print Report Window 
 
It is possible to manipulate the default plain text using the toolbar functions.  The file can 
be saved as a RTF file.  For printing, the user can choose a destination printer from the 
list of printers that are installed on the computer. 
 
The prupose of designing Print Report Window as a RTF editor is to provide the user the 
basic ability to preliminarily manipulate the output information into a formal form, like 
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centering the title line, highlighting the item titles, etc.  Then, it could be printed out as a 
draft formatted record, or, after saving to a RTF file, it can be transfer to a word 
processor for further refining 
 
3.5. Data Menu 
 
After introducing the command buttons in the bottom of Decision Options Window, our 
attention turns to the functions in the menu bar in the top of the window. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Decision Options Window – Data Menu 
 
On the top of Decision Options Window, there is a pull-down menu bar consisting of five 
menus: Data, Analysis, Graphical Results, Uncertainties and Save/Restore.  Only 
Data and Save/Restore menu are described in this chapter.  Other menus will be the 
topics of the following corresponding chapters. 
 
The Data menu is used to merely display the preset information in the analysis model.  
Those data can not be modified under Data menu.  There are five command items in this 
menu.  The Scenario Description command is used to invoke the Scenario Description 
Window for the selected failed component, which is already described in Section 2.2.2. 
Scenario Description Window.  The other commands will be described in the following. 
 
3.5.1. PSA Data 
 
PSA Data command is used to display the PSA Data Window.  In the window shown in 
Figure 15, the PSA data (initiating event frequencies and CCDPs) for each plant state will 
be displayed. 
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The PSA data regarding the nominal plant (with no failed component) are displayed in 
the first table, while in the second table the PSA data regarding the plant with the selected 
failed component are presented.  The differences between the two tables are displayed in 
red color in the second table to make them easily identifiable. 
 
These PSA data can be modified through modifying their median values in the PSA data 
uncertainty-specifying window, which is described in Section 5.1.1. PSA Data.  If these 
PSA data are modified, then close the old PSA Data Window and re-invoke it again, the 
updated PSA data will be shown on the new PSA Data Window. 
 
 
Figure 15 – PSA Data Window 
 
3.5.2. Shutdown Sequence 
 
Shutdown Sequence command is used to invoke the Shutdown Sequence Window, as 
shown in Figure 16.  This window displays the sequence and durations of transition states 
through which the plant transits to the outage state, which is state e.  The sequence 
always starts from state a1. 
 
These data cannot be modified on this window, or even in MIDAS.  The only way to 
modify these data is to modify them in knowledge base, as described in Section 6.1.2. 
Structure of the Tables. 
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Figure 16 – Shutdown Sequence Window 
 
3.5.3. Back to Power Sequence 
 
Back to Power Sequence command is used to invoke the Back to Power Sequence 
Window, as shown in Figure 17.  This window displays the sequence and durations of 
transition states through which the plant returns to the full-power state after a shutdown 
repair.  The final state of this sequence is always state a1.  This is the sequence that on-
line repair (if unsuccessful) and shutdown-repair option should follow. 
 
These data cannot be modified on this window, or even in MIDAS.  The only way to 
modify these data is to modify them in knowledge base, as described in chapter 6. 
 
 
Figure 17 – Back to Power Sequence Window 
 
3.5.4. On-line Repair Shutdown Sequences 
 
On-line Repair Shutdown Sequences command is used to invoke the On-line Repair 
Shutdown Sequences Window, as shown in Figure 18.  If on-line repair fails and the plant 
does not trip, it is necessary to shutdown the plant and repairs the failed component. 
 
This window displays the sequence and durations of transition states depending on the 
final repair state to be attained.  The starting state of those sequences is always state a1. 
 
These data cannot be modified on this window, or even in MIDAS.  The only way to 
modify these data is to modify them in knowledge base, as described in chapter 6. 
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Figure 18 – On-line Repair Shutdown Sequences Window 
 
3.6. Save and Restore the Settings 
 
The Save/Restore menu has two command items: Save and Restore.  Save command is 
used to save the current settings of the model, including all parameters related to decision 
options, parameter uncertainties, PSA data, initiating event outcomes and performance 
measure weights.  The data will be saved in a text file whose name and location are 
chosen by the user.  That type of file is called model file, because it contains all of the 
critical data and setting for an analysis model. 
 
The Restore command, on the other hand, in charge of restore the settings and 
parameters stored in a model file.  Using model file, it saves some time to process or re-
analyze an incident/scenario avoiding start from the very beginning. 
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4. Point-Estimate Calculation 
 
No uncertainties are modeled in point-estimate calculation and the median values of the 
model parameters (PSA data, repair durations, worker dose, etc.) are used. 
 
To perform the point-estimate calculation, use the Point Calculation command in the 
Analysis menu. 
 
 
Figure 19 – Decision Options Window – Analysis Menu 
 
4.1. Consideration about the Final Shutdown Sequence 
 
Before performing point calculation, the user can choose whether to take into account the 
PI contribution from the final shutdown sequence to the planned outage.  Final shutdown 
sequence is the shutdown sequence of the planned outage in the end of one fuel cycle, as 
shown in Figure 20.  For Continue-as-is option, the plant is with the failed component all 
the way to outage phase, therefore the risk should be higher in outage.  However, for the 
other two option types, the plant condition is nominal at the period of outage.  The final 
shutdown sequence follows the regular shutdown sequence that is described in Section 
3.5.2. Shutdown Sequence. 
 
The default setting of this option is taking into account the PI contribution from final 
shutdown sequence.  If the user would like to switch the setting, click the Consider Final 
Shutdown Sequence sub-command under Calculation Options in Analysis menu to 
uncheck the option, as shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 20 – Decision Option Time Lines 
 
4.2. Point Calculation 
 
After pressing the Point Calculation command, MIDAS performs the necessary 
calculations (usually the computer time is less than a second) and the results are 
displayed on the Performance Index Window, as shown in Figure 21.  The window shows 
the expected total PI value for each option.  Remember that the PI represent the degree of 
disutility associated with that option, so, the decision rule is the following: the smaller the 
PI is, the more preferable the option is. 
 
Clicking the Print Report button, a Print Report Window will appear presenting the 
result.  To see details about the functions of the Print Report Window please refer to 
Section 3.4. Print Report. 
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Figure 21 – Performance Index Window 
 
It is important to understand what the driving factors of the decision are, i.e. which PM 
that plays a leading role in the specific scenario.  To obtain this information, the user can 
use the Show Details button.  This will show the single contributions from each PM to 
the total PI, as shown in Figure 22.  The PI is obtained adding the single contributions 
from the PMs multiplied by their relative weight (and by the number of worker involved 
for the repair-type PMs).  In addition to the contribution to the total PI, a measure of risk 
is provided under the column “core damage”.  This value gives the probability of core 
damage in the specified scenario.  The time window of the scenario goes from the 
beginning of the repair sequence to the next planned outage, thus the total observation 
time is the same for all decision options. 
 
The Euros button on the extended Performance Index Window is used to present these PI 
values in term of equivalent amount of Euros.  It helps users to evaluate the impact from 
each PM in term of cost. 
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Figure 22 – Performance Index Window – PM Details 
 
4.3. Graphical Results 
 
Only after a point-estimate calculation was performed, the Graphic Results menu in the 
menu bar becomes active.  It will show the results of the calculation in one of the two 
graphical fashion: index plots and radar chart. 
 
 
Figure 23 – Decision Options Window – Graphical Results Menu 
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4.3.1. Performance Index Plots 
 
Clicking the Performance Index Plots command, it appears a PI Plots Window 
consisting of two plots. 
 
 
Figure 24 – Performance Index Plots 
 
The options on the right side are sorted according to their PI.  On the left side, the 
abscissa in both plots represents the PI value.  In the upper plot, the y-axis represents the 
worst PM value for each option.  In the lower plot, the y-axis represents the core damage 
probability for each option.  The values in the plots are meant to be relative values and 
not absolute values. 
 
4.3.2. Radar Chart 
 
Another way to represent graphically the contribution of the different PM is to use a radar 
chart.  After performing the point-estimate calculation, click the Radar Chart command.  
A Radar Chart Window will appear (see Figure 25). 
 
This graphical presentation helps the user to realize the strength/weakness for each option.  
The best values lie on the outer part of the hexagon and the scales are relative scales. 
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Figure 25 – Radar Chart 
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5. Sensitivity Analysis and Uncertainty Analysis 
 
The model parameters, such as the PSA frequencies and probabilities, are not exactly 
known.  It is then important to assess how the uncertainties associated with those 
parameters can influence the final results of the analysis.  This can be quantified through 
sensitivity and uncertainty analysis.  The application is able to handle and simulate 
uncertainties on virtually all the parameters in the model. 
 
5.1. Specify the Data Uncertainty 
 
The first step of analysis is to quantify the uncertainties of the parameters.  These 
uncertainties are described using either a uniform distribution or a log-normal distribution 
depending on the parameter nature.  The user can specify the uncertainties by setting the 
median and upper bound of their distribution.  The upper bound corresponds to the 95th 
percentile for the log-normal distribution.  The lower bound is computed automatically 
by the software given the median and upper bound specified by the user.  The user can 
also choose to change only the median value without specifying any upper bound.  This 
permits to perform the point-estimate calculation described in last chapter for just 
different point values of the parameters.  To specify uncertainties the user can use the 
pull-down Uncertainties menu.  The uncertainties are divided into three groups 
corresponding to the sub-menus PSA Data, Options Parameters and Model 
Parameters. 
 
5.1.1. PSA Data 
 
The parameters grouped under the PSA data category are the initiating event (IE) 
frequencies and conditional core damage probabilities (CCDP) describing the plant safety 
behavior in the different states.  There are two sets of values, the first set describes the 
plant in the nominal state (i.e. with no failed component), while the second set describes 
the plant behavior taking into account the failed component. 
 
For example, by choosing the Nominal Component sub-menu and then the IE 
frequencies sub-menu, a table like the one in Figure 27 will appear.  For each parameter 
the user can edit the upper and the median values (in black color).  The lower bound 
value (in red color) will be updated automatically.  If no uncertainties have been set on 
the parameters the lower and upper bound textboxes will be blank. 
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Figure 26 – Parameter Uncertainty – PSA Data Menu 
 
The Reset command in PSA Data sub-menu will erase all the uncertainties previously 
input.  Note that performing this command not only the uncertainties will be erased but 
also the default median values will be restored.  The default median values are the ones 
contained in the knowledge base database. 
 
To facilitate the user in editing the PSA uncertainties, default uncertainty values have 
been stored in the knowledge base.  The user can upload these values using the Default 
values command in the PSA Data sub-menu. 
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Figure 27 – PSA Data Uncertainties Window 
 
5.1.2. Options Parameters 
 
Option parameters are the parameters used to describe the decision options.  One 
parameter that is common to all the option is the time left to the next planned outage.  To 
modify this parameter uncertainty use the Time to next outage command.  On the other 
hand, to modify parameters specific to each option, such as worker dose or repair 
durations, the user can use the Specific Option command after having selected the 
desired option. 
 
The procedure is the same as that has been described for the PSA data uncertainties in 
previous section.  The windows used to edit those uncertainties are presented in Figure 28 
and Figure 29. 
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Figure 28 – Time to Next Outage Uncertainty Window 
 
 
Figure 29 – Specific Option Uncertainty Window 
 
5.1.3. Model Parameters 
 
Model parameters are the parameters describing the decision model.  They affect the way 
the analysis is performed.  They describe, for instance, the decision maker preferences 
and average downtime costs. 
 
Three different commands are available in the Model Parameters sub-menu: Downtime 
cost, IE consequences and PM weights. 
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Figure 30 – Parameter Uncertainty – Model Parameters Menu 
 
5.1.3.1. Downtime Cost 
Downtime cost is the expected economic loss due to loss of power production while the 
reactor is shutdown.  The units of downtime cost are Euros per shutdown day. 
 
 
Figure 31 – Downtime Cost Uncertainty Window 
 
5.1.3.2. IE Consequences 
IE consequences represent the expected outcome (in terms of PM) incurred in case of 
initiating events.  Only cost and public dose uncertainties can be defined because these 
two only are continuous outcome PMs.  The other outcome PM is external attention, but 
because of the non-numerical scale, it is impossible to define the uncertainty in the same 
way as the others.  For each initiating event family a median value and its uncertainty can 
be defined.  For a complete list of the different initiating event families please refer to 
Appendix C. 
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Figure 32 – IE Consequences Uncertainty Window 
5.1.3.3. PM Weights 
The PM weights are used to describe the tradeoffs between different PMs.  Among all the 
different parameters these are likely to be the most controversial, because by their very 
nature their value is subjective and can change among different decision makers.  It is 
then very useful to be able to perform sensitivity and uncertainty analyses on these 
parameters to see how if the results are robust enough with respect to PM weights. 
 
 
Figure 33 – PM Weights Uncertainty Window 
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5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
After specifying the desired uncertainties, it is possible to perform a sensitivity analysis 
using the Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis command in the Analysis menu. 
 
The analysis will take a few seconds depending on the number of options and the number 
of uncertainties to be modeled.  Upon completion, the results of the analysis will be 
presented in the form of tornado diagrams. 
 
 
Figure 34 – Sensitivity Analysis Window 
 
The analysis consists in varying, one at a time, the uncertain parameters between their 
lower and upper bound and calculating the resulting PI.  Only the results for the ten most 
important parameters are shown, ranked by their importance.  Importance is defined here 
as the variation in the final result.  Thus the more important a parameter is, the more it 
can affect the final result. 
 
Two different diagrams are presented.  In the first, the PI values for the optimal option 
only are presented.  The optimal option is defined as the one that has the lowest PI 
performing a point-estimate calculation.  In the second diagram, if the optimal option 
changes upon variation of the parameter value, the PI value of the new optimal option is 
presented. 
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Each line in the diagram corresponds to a single parameter.  Below the parameter 
description the range of its variation is reported.  The range of the parameter is the 
determined by the lower and upper bounds as defined by the user.  On the same line also 
the number of the option whose PI value is considered is reported, i.e. the optimal option 
in the left diagram and the current optimal option in the right one.  The different colored 
bars represent the variation in PI value.  The numerical PI values obtained are written on 
the bars extremities.  Same parameters on the two diagrams have bars with the same 
colors. 
 
The purpose of having the two different diagrams is to observe how far the influences of 
parameter uncertainties can reach among the options.  It is important for the decision 
maker to know if the optimal solution can change because of parameter uncertainties. 
 
Clicking the Print Report button, a Print Report Window will appear presenting the 
result.  To see details about the functions of the Print Report Window, please refer to 
Section 3.4. Print Report. 
 
The one-way sensitivity performed by MIDAS provides only a first approximation of 
what the effects of uncertainties can be.  By varying only one parameter at a time 
potential interactions among different parameters are neglected.  To perform a more 
realistic uncertainty analysis all the uncertain parameters have to be changed 
simultaneously. 
 
Through the check boxes beside every parameter description the user can select the ones 
on which he or she wants to perform such uncertainty analysis.  The analysis is then 
started clicking on the Uncertainty button. 
 
5.3. Uncertainty Analysis 
 
The uncertainty analysis is performed through Monte Carlo sampling.  This technique 
enables the calculation of expected values to any degree of precision even for complex 
distributions. 
 
Initially a Confirmation Window appears.  On the left side of the window, a list of the 
selected parameters is presented for confirmation. The user is also asked to insert the 
number of histories to be simulated.  Remember that increasing the number of histories 
will increase the precision of the result but at the same time will increase the time 
required for the computation.  Given that a high degree of precision is not necessary it is 
a good idea to start with a low number of histories and eventually perform again the 
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calculation with a larger number if necessary.  The default value is 100 histories.  This 
value seems to be enough for most scenarios. 
 
The calculation can take from several seconds up to minutes depending on the number of 
options, number of parameters to be modeled and number of histories to simulate. 
 
 
Figure 35 – Uncertainty Analysis Confirmation Window 
 
When the necessary simulations are performed, the results of the analysis are presented 
on the Uncertainty Analysis Results Window. 
 
On the left side of the window, the optimality frequency for every option is reported.  The 
optimality frequency is defined as the probability that the option will be the best one 
among all available.  The estimate of this probability value is reported together with the 
95-confidence interval.  For example in Figure 36 the probability that option number 1 is 
the best choice is 73%, with a 95-confidence interval ranging from 71% to 75%. 
 
On the right side of the window, the distribution of the obtained PI values is plotted.  It is 
possible to plot the distributions for each option simply by clicking on the option 
description. 
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Clicking the Print Report button, a Print Report Window will appear presenting the 
result.  To see details about the functions of the Print Report Window, please refer to 
Section 3.4. Print Report. 
 
 
Figure 36 – Uncertainty Analysis Results Window 
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6. Knowledge Base 
 
The knowledge base is a Microsoft Access database file in which all the relevant data are 
stored.  It contains all the necessary default information about the failed component/event, 
the PSA data, and the weights for the value tree and disutility functions to perform the 
analysis.  While MIDAS is modeling and analyzing a minor incident scenario, it accesses 
the knowledge base automatically to get the necessary data in a transparent way for the 
user. 
 
The knowledge base needs to be accessed by the user only when he wants to modify it 
directly by inserting a new case study (for example about new components to model) or 
to edit existing data. 
 
For MIDAS to run properly, the knowledge base file has to be named “option_kb.mdb” 
and must to be in the same folder as the executable.  In the following sections, the 
structure of the knowledge base will be described, as well as the steps necessary to 
implement a new case study. 
 
 
6.1. The Organization of Knowledge Base 
 
6.1.1. The Information Stored 
 
The information stored in the knowledge base is organized in the following tables. 
 
1) Disutility Functions and Value Tree information: 
- Table “Cost” 
- Table “Dose” (This PM refers to the dose delivered to the public.) 
- Table “Worker_dose” 
- Table “External_attention” 
- Table “Industrial_accident” 
- Table “Weights” 
 
2) State transitions information: 
- Table “Repair_state” 
- Table “Back_to_power” 
- Table “Shutdown_sequence” 
- Table “Temp_repair_state” 
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3)  Outcome information: 
- Table “downtime” 
- Table “Outcomes” 
 
4) PSA information: 
- Table “PSA_nominal” 
- Table “PSA_nominal_upper” 
- Table “PSA_component_name” 
- Table “PSA_component_name_upper” 
 
5) Component information: 
- Table “Component_list” 
 
6.1.2. Structure of the Tables 
 
Disutility Functions and Value Tree tables 
 
In these tables the information about the disutility functions and the weights of the 
performance measures of the value tree are stored.  The five tables describing the 
disutility functions for performance measures are named after the corresponding 
performance measure. 
 
These five tables are composed of two fields: “Attribute” and “Value”.  In the first field 
the value of the possible outcomes are listed, while in the second field are presented the 
corresponding disutility values (ranging from zero to unity).  The units of each PM are 
listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Performance Measures Units 
Table Units 
“Cost” € [losses] 
“Dose” Sv 
“Worker_dose” Sv 
“External_attention” Action requested by regulatory organization 
“Industrial_accident” Type of injury 
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To clarify the structure of the tables, consider the 
“Cost” table.  The first column presents an Access 
automatic numeration and is not important for the 
purpose of the knowledge base.  The second column 
reports different outcome values ranging from the 
minimum to the maximum possible value of the 
predefined scale.  In the third column it is reported the 
corresponding disutility value. 
 
For instance, the disutility value corresponding to a loss 
of 10,000 € is equal to 0.000849.  To perform its analysis, MIDAS will interpolate 
linearly the values presented in the table to calculate disutility values associated to losses 
amount not directly reported in the table.  For example, a loss of 5,000 € will correspond 
to a disutility value of 
 
( ) 000377.0000,4
000,9
000849.0000,1000,5
000,1000,10
]000,1[]000,10[]000,1[]000,5[ ==−−
−+= UUUU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table “Weights” stores the relative values of the weights of the different performance 
measures as they appear in the value tree.  These values describe the relative importance 
of the performance measures. For example, the cost performance measure is considered 
almost twice as important as the external attention performance measure, while the dose 
and the external attention performance measure have the same relative importance.  
These relative tradeoffs do not mean to be absolute, but have to be interpreted taking into 
account the interval represented by each of them. 
 
State Transition Tables 
 
These tables contain the information about the most common ways to shut down the plant 
from the a1 state (at power) to any repair state and coming back from the repair state to 
a1 state.  In addition, there are tables for final outage shutdown sequence and the 
shutdown repair sequences for the case that fails to on-line repair. 
 
Cost 
ID Attribute Value 
1 1000 0 
2 10000 0.000849 
3 100000 0.003464 
4 1000000 0.014142 
5 10000000 0.067082 
6 100000000 1 
Weights 
ID Cost External_attention Industrial_accident Dose Worker_dose 
1 0.45039 0.270234 0.008693 0.270234 0.00045 
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The first table, “Repair_state” stores the transition sequences that the plant undergoes for 
going from power operation to any given shutdown state.  The table is composed of the 
following six fields: 
 
1) Final:  final shutdown state in which the 
repair will be made. 
2) Number:  number of intermediate states in the 
sequence. 
3) a:  duration in hours spent in this state. 
4) b:  duration in hours spent in this state. 
5) c:  duration in hours spent in this state. 
6) d:  duration in hours spent in this state. 
 
 
 
 
For example, the fourth record of the table describes a scenario in which the plant is 
shutdown and the repair is made in the d state.  The sequence described in the table is the 
following: 
 
The “Back_to_power” table is organized in the 
same way as the “Repair_state” table but it 
contains information for the transition sequences 
that the plant undergoes for going from the repair 
state back to power. 
 
Continuing the above example, where the repair is 
performed in the d state, after the repair has been 
completed the plant will be taken back to power.  
The sequence is described by the fourth record in the table and is represented in the 
diagram below. 
 
Repair_state 
ID Final Number a b c d 
1 a 0     
2 b 1 6    
3 c 2 6 8   
4 d 3 6 77 3  
5 e 4 6 77 3 27 
6 d 3 6 8 72  
7 e 4 6 8 72 27 
Back_to_power 
ID Repair_state Number d c b a
1 a 0   
2 b 1   12
3 c 2   48 12
4 d 3  34 48 12
5 e 4 40 34 48 12
State a1 
(at power) 
State a 
6 hours 
State b 
77 hours 
State c 
3 hours 
State d 
(repair state) 
3 intermediate states 
Time spent in the state 
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The “Shutdown_sequence” table contains the sequence and 
durations of transition states through which the plant transits to 
the final outage state, which is state e.  The sequence always 
starts from state a1. 
 
If on-line repair fails and the plant does not trip, the plant 
has to be shutdown and to repair the failed component.  
“Temp_repair_state” table contains the sequence and 
durations of transition states through which the plant transits 
to five different repair states (a through e).  The starting 
state of those sequences is always from state a1. 
 
 
 
Outcome Tables 
 
The outcome tables contain the outcome information about the terminal nodes of the 
decision trees used by MIDAS to perform the analysis. 
 
The “downtime” table stores the information about the expected losses 
due to loss of power production while the reactor is shut down.  The 
table is composed only of one record in which the daily cost is 
represented in €. 
 
The table “Outcomes” stores the average outcomes due to an initiating event.  Every 
record corresponds to a different IE category and reports the expected values of all the 
performance measures. 
 
The reported values are relative only to scenarios in which an initiating event happened 
but the sequence was recovered and did not develop in a core damage accident. 
 
Shutdown_sequence 
ID a b c d 
1 4 22 44 50 
Temp_repair_state 
ID Final Number a b c d 
1 a 0     
2 b 1 4    
3 c 2 4 22   
4 d 3 4 22 44  
5 e 4 4 22 44 50 
downtime 
ID Unit Cost 
1 Day 300000 
State d 
(repair state) 
State c 
34 hours 
State b 
48 hours 
State a 
12 hours 
State a1 
(at power) 
3 intermediate states 
Time spent in the state 
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Outcomes 
ID IE_family Cost External_attention Dose
1 aprp 55000000 Long shutdown 0.2 
2 atws 12000000 Formal Notice  
3 psf 12000000 Formal Notice  
4 psl 2400000 Inspection  
5 rte 40000000 Long shutdown  
6 rtgv 40000000 Formal Notice 0.133
7 rtv 40000000 Long shutdown  
8 tgta 300000 Report  
9 trcp 300000 Report  
 
For example, in the event of LOOP (Loss of Offsite Power, corresponding to the PSL 
category), the consequences would be an average loss of 2,400,000 € and a likely 
inspection by the regulatory agency.  The units are the same in Table 1. 
 
PSA Tables 
 
In these tables the information about the chance nodes of the decision trees are stored.  
This information is used by MIDAS to model the plant behavior.  All the frequencies of 
initiating events and the conditional core damage probabilities (CCDP) are presented and 
organized by IE categories and plant states. 
 
In the “PSA_nominal” table the nominal PSA values are presented.  Nominal value 
means that the plant is operating in normal condition, without any failed component. 
The numerical values used have been obtained from the Risk-Spectrum model of the 
EPS-1300 reactor. They are median values. 
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The IE frequency (lambda) values are expressed in events-per-year units.  “lambda_a” 
represents the IE frequency at plant state a. CCDP represents the conditional probability 
of core damage given the occurrence of the specified IE.  So “ccdp_b” represents the 
CCDP at plant state b given that the specific initiating event happened. 
 
For example, let us suppose that the plant is in the shutdown state b. In the seventh row, 
corresponding to the IE family RTV (secondary steam line rupture) we read that the 
frequency of a secondary steam line rupture is 0.0103 per-year. Given that such a rupture 
happened the probability of having a core damage accident can be read in the CCDP 
column to be equal to 0.000109. 
 
Additional data are stored in other tables to present the plant behavior when a certain 
component is failed.  The table referring to a specific failed component has to be named 
after the component name (as it appears exactly in the field “Component” of the table 
“Component_list”) following the convention of “PSA_ component_name”. 
 
For example, for the component “Pressure Transducer”, there is a table named 
“PSA_Pressure Transducer” that contains the data about the plant behavior when the 
pressure transducer is failed. 
 
To save storage space and to avoid typing errors, only the values that differ from the 
nominal ones are reported in the degraded PSA data tables. For the empty fields MIDAS 
will use the value reported in the “PSA_nominal” table. 
 
PSA_nominal 
ID IE_family lambda_a ccdp_a 
lambda_
b ccdp_b 
lambda_
c ccdp_c lambda_d Ccdp_d 
lambda
_e 
ccdp_
e 
1 aprp 0.00294 0.000614 0.0244 0.00426 0.449 0.000153 0.00265 0.0199   
2 atws 0.0768 0.0000186    
3 psf 0.000131 0.00301 0.0302 0.000232 0.000367 0.000645 0.000113 0.0000898   
4 psl 0.672 0.0000011 0.672 0.00000426 0.672 0.000000372 0.672 0.00000429   
5 rte 0.00125 0.000711 0.00125 0.000912    
6 rtgv 0.016 0.0000334 0.0138 0.0000238 0.00672 0.000000399    
7 rtv 0.00421 0.000211 0.0103 0.000109    
8 tgta 0.698 0.000000075 0.698 0.000000075    
9 trcp 0.0391 0.0000071 3.62 0.0000000258 0.0567 0.0000512 0.154 0.0000725   
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Thus, for the example of the pressure transducer case, where the failure results in an 
increase of a primary transient, only the frequencies of the primary transients initiating 
events (category TRCP) are stored in the degraded PSA data tables. The values presented 
in the specific table thus describe the values to be used to model the plant behavior when 
the pressure transducer is fail. 
 
PSA_Pressure Transducer 
ID IE_family lambda_a ccdp_a lambda_b ccdp_b lambda_c ccdp_c lambda_d ccdp_d lambda_e ccdp_e
1 aprp      
2 atws      
3 psf      
4 psl      
5 rte      
6 rtgv      
7 rtv      
8 tgta      
9 trcp 0.1391  3.72 0.10567 0.254    
 
To perform uncertainty analysis on the parameters, default values for the upper bounds of 
the PSA data are reported in the corresponding “PSA_nominal_upper” and 
“PSA_component_name_upper” tables. The uncertainty on these values is modeled 
through a lognormal distribution and the upper bounds correspond to the 95th percentile. 
 
Component Table 
 
This table contains the list of all the components/scenarios modeled in MIDAS.  For each 
component it contains the information about the default decision options and their 
detailed data. 
 
Component_list 
ID Component Continue
Repair_
state 
Repair_
duration
Repair_work
er_dose 
Temp_d
uration 
Temp_
p_ok 
Temp_p
_trip 
Temp_
trip_IE 
Temp_Wo
rker_dose 
Des_File_N
ame 
1 Pressure 
Transducer 
1 a,b,c,d,e 5,5,5,5,5 0,0,0,0,0.035 5 0.9 0.01 9 0.01 pretrans.txt 
2 Steam 
Generator 
(suspected 
0 d,e 288,288 0,0.035      sgleak.txt 
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Component_list 
ID Component Continue
Repair_
state 
Repair_
duration
Repair_work
er_dose 
Temp_d
uration 
Temp_
p_ok 
Temp_p
_trip 
Temp_
trip_IE 
Temp_Wo
rker_dose 
Des_File_N
ame 
leak) 
 
Component_list (continue) 
Repair_work
er_number 
Repair_accide
nt_frequency 
Repair_fatalit
y_fraction 
Repair_major_
injury_fraction
Temp_Worke
r_number 
Temp_Acciden
t_frequency 
Temp_Fatal
ity_fraction 
Temp_Major
_injury_fracti
on 
8,10,10,10,10 0.001,0.001,0.0
01,0.001,0.002 
0.01,0.01,0.0
1,0.01,0.01 
0.1,0.2,0.2,0.2,
0.2 
10 0.011 0.01 0.1 
2,2 0.01,0.01 0.01,0.01 0.1,0.1     
 
The information is structured in the following fields: 
 
1) Component: The name of the failed component. This name has to 
be the same as the one appearing in the PSA table 
names. 
2) Continue: This is a flag whose value can be either 0 or 1. 0 
means that the continue-as-is option is not possible, 
while 1 means that the continue-as-is option is 
possible. 
3) Repair_state: Shutdown states in which the repair can be made. If 
more than one repair state is possible, then the 
different states are separated by a comma “,”. (No 
blank spaces must appear). 
4) Repair_duration: The total duration of the repair in hours. If more than 
one repair state is possible, then the different durations 
are separated by a comma “,”. (No blank spaces must 
appear). 
5) Repair_worker_dose The amount of radiation dose (Sv) that the workers 
will receive performing the specific repair. If more 
than one repair state is possible, then the different 
durations are separated by a comma “,”. (No blank 
spaces must appear). 
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6) Temp_duration: Duration of the repair in hours if the on-line repair 
option (called also repair-at-power) is possible, 
otherwise blank. 
7) Temp_p_ok: The probability of a successful repair in the on-line 
repair option.  Blank if this type of option is not 
available. 
8) Temp_p_trip: The probability of tripping the plant while the on-line 
repair is performed.  Blank if this type of option is not 
available. 
9) Temp_trip_IE: The category of the initiating event caused by a plant 
trip while the on-line repair is performed.  Blank if 
this type of option is not available. 
10) Temp_Worker_dose: The amount of radiation dose (Sv) that the workers 
will receive performing the on-line repair. 
11) Des_File_Name: The file name of the file containing a description of 
the scenario.  This file is a plain text file. 
12) Repair_worker_number: The number of workers involved in the repair. 
13) Repair_accident_frequency: The frequency (per worker hour) of industrial 
accidents during the repair. 
14) Repair_fatality_fraction: The fraction of fatalities among all industrial accidents. 
15) Repair_major_injury_fraction: The fraction of major injuries among all industrial 
accidents. 
16) Temp_worker_number: The number of workers involved in the on-line repair. 
17) Temp_accident_frequency: The frequency (per worker hour) of industrial 
accidents during the on-line repair. 
18) Temp_fatality_fraction: The fraction of fatalities among all industrial accidents 
for an on-line repair. 
19) Temp_major_injury_fraction: The fraction of major injuries among all industrial 
accidents during the on-line repair. 
20) Temp_repair_state: The shutdown state where the repair has to be 
performed if the on-line repair is unsuccessful. 
21) Temp_duration_unsucc: The duration of the repair in case the on-line repair is 
unsuccessful. 
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6.2. Adding a New Scenario 
 
The modification or the addition of new scenarios has to be done directly on the 
knowledge base. 
 
If the structure of the knowledge base is corrupted, this will lead to runtime errors during 
the analysis. It is then important for the user to follow the conventions and format 
described above to maintain the correct structure of the knowledge base. Also, it is 
suggested to copy the knowledge base file before modifying it, so it is always possible to 
restore it in case of mistakes.  Backup is important, especially for the user who is not 
acquainted with the operation of Microsoft Access.  Please note also that all text in the 
knowledge base is case-sensitive. 
 
For adding a new scenario into the knowledge base, several parameters describing the 
scenario should be prepared.  As a checklist, the following table lists the necessary 
parameters. 
 
The procedure to perform the addition of a new scenario will be described step-by-step 
using a fictitious case as example. 
 
6.2.1. Example Description 
 
Let us suppose that to fix this kind of incident, the plant has necessarily to be shutdown to 
perform the repair, so, the continue-as-is and on-line repair options are not possible.  The 
possible repair states are state d or state e, with repair durations 100 hours and 388 hours, 
respectively.  The workers performing the repair will receive 0 and 0.04Sv of dose for the 
two repair states.  The number of workers needed to perform the repair is 10 and 12, 
respectively.  The frequencies of occurrence of industrial accidents are 0.001 and 0.002 
(1/hr).  In the event an industrial accident occurs, the conditional probabilities of a fatality 
are 0.01 and 0.01, and the conditional probabilities of a major injury are 0.1 and 0.1. 
 
The occurrence of this incident will result in the frequency of initiating event PSF (loss of 
cold source) to increase to 0.1 events-per-year and frequency of initiating event TRCP 
(primary transient) to increase to 0.14 events-per-year, under plant state a.  Also, the 
uncertainties on these two parameters can be described through a lognormal distribution 
with error factor equal to 3. 
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Table 2 – New Scenario Data 
Item 
No. 
Description Unit Example 
1 Failed component name  
XXX valve 
leak 
2 Continue-as-is option is possible or not?  Yes 
3 Repair states (shutdown-repair)  d, e 
4 Repair durations (shutdown-repair) hour 20, 30 
5 Repair worker doses (shutdown-repair) Sv 0, 0.02 
6 Numbers of repair workers (shutdown-repair) Person 2, 3 
7 Accident frequencies (shutdown-repair) 1/hour 0.001, 0.001 
8 Fatality fraction (shutdown-repair)  0.01, 0.01 
9 Major injury fraction (shutdown-repair)  0.10, 0.10 
10 Repair duration (on-line repair) hour 50 
11 Probability of success (on-line repair)  0.9 
12 Probability of trip (on-line repair)  0.02 
13 IE category (on-line repair)  9 
14 Repair worker dose (on-line repair) Sv 0.04 
15 Number of repair workers (on-line repair) Person 2 
16 Accident frequencies (on-line repair) 1/hour 0.001 
17 Fatality fraction (on-line repair)  0.01 
18 Major injury fraction (on-line repair)  0.10 
19 Repair state if unsuccessful (on-line repair)  c 
20 Repair duration if unsuccessful (on-line repair) hour 50 
21 Scenario description file (optional) 
text 
file 
Valve.txt 
22 
The PSA data that will be affected by the 
occurrence of incident 
  
 
6.2.2. Step-by-Step Procedure to Add a New Scenario 
 
The procedure of implementing the addition of this new scenario is as follows: 
1) After backing up the original knowledge base file “option_kb.mbd” to another folder, 
open this file with Microsoft Access 97 or above. 
2) Open the “Component_list” table.  Click Insert-New Record on the menu bar to 
insert a new record. 
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3) Type in the name of the failed component or event in the field “Component”.  This 
name should be unique.  The number in the field “ID” will be generated automatically.  
The ID number is not important for the purpose of the knowledge base.  Write 
“Fictitious case” for the demo case. 
4) If the option type continue-as-is is possible, then write “1” in the field “Continue”; 
otherwise fill a “0”. 
In the demo case, “0” should be filled. 
5) Write in the three fields “Repair_state”, “Repair_duration” and 
“Repair_Worker_dose” with the shutdown states at which the repair of the failed 
component is performed, their repair duration in hours and the dose (Sv) that will be 
received by the workers performing that type of repair, respectively. If more than one 
state are possible, then separate them using commas “,”. Do not use blank spaces or 
other separation characters. The order of options has to be the same for these three 
fields. 
 
For the demo case write “d,e” in the “Repair_state” field, write “100,388” in the 
“Repair_duration” field and “0,0.04” in the “Repair_worker_dose” field. 
6) Fill in the four fields “Repair_worker_number”, “Repair_accident_frequency”,  
“Repair_fatality_fraction” and “Repair_major_injury_fraction” with the numbers of 
workers needs to perform the repairs, the frequencies that an industrial accident will 
happen, the conditional probability that a worker will die due to the accident, and will 
happen, and the conditional probability that a worker will suffer from major injury 
due to the accident.  If more than one repair states are possible, then separate them 
using commas “,”.  Do not use blank spaces or other separation characters.  The order 
of options has to be the same for these four fields. 
 
For the demo case, write “10,12” in the “Repair_worker_number” field, write 
“0.001,0.002” in the “Repair_accident_frequency” field and “0.01,0.01” in the 
“Repair_fatality_fraction” field, and “0.1,0.1” in the “Repair_major_injury_fraction” 
field. 
7) If the option to repair the component at power is possible, then insert the necessary 
information in the remaining fields: duration of the repair in “Temp_duration”, 
probability of a successful repair in “Temp_p_ok”, probability of tripping the plant in 
“Temp_p_trip”, category of initiating event caused by the trip in “Temp_trip_IE” and 
the dose (Sv) received by workers during repair in “Temp_Worker_dose”.  Do the 
same for the repair state and relative duration in case the on-line repair is 
unsuccessful.  Insert the relevant data in the fileds “Temp_duration_unsucc” and 
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“Temp_repair_state”.  Leave all these fields blank if this option is not possible. 
 
Please notice that only one option of on-line repair can be inserted in the knowledge 
base.  If more than one option of on-line repair is possible, it can be added to the 
option list during runtime. 
In the demo case, because on-line repair is not possible, leave these five fields blank. 
8) If the option to repair the component at power is possible, write in the four fields 
“Temp_worker_number”, “Temp_accident_frequency”,  “Temp _fatality_fraction” 
and “Temp _major_injury_fraction” with the numbers of worker needs to perform on-
line repair, the frequency that an industrial accident will happen, the conditional 
probability that a worker will die due to the accident, and will happen, the conditional 
probability that a worker will suffer from major injury due to the accident. If more 
than one state are possible, then separate them using commas “,”. Do not use blank 
spaces or other separation characters. The order of options has to be the same for 
these four fields 
9)  Prepare a description file for the new scenario.  The description has to be contained 
in a text file (.txt extension) to be put in the same folder as the knowledge base file.  
The information contained in this file will be useful for the user to have a full 
description of the scenario and the underlying assumptions. Write the name of this 
file (including the .txt extension) in the field “Des_File_Name”.  If no description 
file is prepared, just leave this field blank.  
 
For the demo case, the new record in “Component_list” table should look like the 
following (assume that the description file name is named fic.txt). 
10) Close the “Component_list” table. 
11) Create two new tables named “PSA_component_name” and 
“PSA_component_name_upper”, where “component_name” must be exactly the 
same as the input “Component” in the step 2.  The structure of these tables must be 
exactly like the structure of the “PSA_nominal” and “PSA_nominal_upper” tables.  It 
would be better to create them by copying the “PSA_nominal” and 
“PSA_nominal_upper” tables, and cleaning out the contents about IE frequency and 
CCDP. 
 
To copy the “PSA_nominal” table, highlight the “PSA_nominal” table in the database 
window, and then press Edit-Copy and Edit-Paste on the menu bar.  A Paste Table 
As window will appear.  Select Structure and Data button (the default button), and 
input the table name “PSA_component_name”.  Do the similar procedure for creating 
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“PSA_component_name_upper”. 
 
For the demo case, the new tables have to be named “PSA_Fictitious case” and 
“PSA_Fictitious case_upper”. 
12) Fill in these two tables with only the PSA values (IE frequencies and CCDP) that will 
differ from the nominal ones when the component is failed. The same cells have to be 
filled in the two different tables.  The values reported in the 
“PSA_component_name_upper” table are the 95th percentile of the lognormal 
distributions modeling the uncertainties of the corresponding values in the 
“PSA_component_name” table, which are median values. 
13) The addition of a new scenario in the knowledge base is finished.  Close the 
“PSA_component_name” and “PSA_component_name_upper” tables. 
14) Close the knowledge base file “option_kb.mbd”. 
15) Test-run MIDAS to verify the correct format of the modified knowledge base. 
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1. Introduction 
 
MIDAS is the acronym for Minor Incident Decision Analysis Software, which is an 
incident management tool for nuclear power plants.  MIDAS was designed to help plant 
managers, staff, supporting engineers, or operating engineers in assessing the decision 
alternatives of minor incidents or event scenarios and in making decisions.  MIDAS 
implements the risk-informed decision-making and incident management methodology 
developed in the project “The Use of PSA to Support Operational Decision Making in 
Nuclear Power Plants.” 
 
This manual is intended to describe the programming aspect of the MIDAS code, in order 
to enable the reader to have the ability of maintaining and modifying the source code.  
There is another MIDAS document, MIDAS User’s Manual, describing how to use this 
software from the user’s point of view. 
 
MIDAS is written in Microsoft Visual BASIC 6.0.  It is a stand-alone window-driven 
software, which operates on Microsoft Windows 95/98/2000/XP of any language version 
and supports Microsoft ADO (ActiveX Data Object) interface. 
 
It is assumed that the users of this manual (i.e. the programmers.  This term is used in the 
rest of this manual) are familiar with the basic elements of Visual Basic (specifically, 
version 6).  If necessary, the programmer has the ability to refer to specific Visual Basic 
reference books for more information.  In addition, the programmer should have the 
experience of using MIDAS, and understand the methodology of risk-informed decision-
making and minor incident management. 
 
For practical purpose, the detailed working process of the MIDAS code is not presented 
in this manual.  This is not a document that explains the source code line by line.  There 
are sufficient comments and explanatory text presented around MIDAS source code itself 
to achieve this purpose; therefore it is assumed that the programmer has the complete 
source code listing in hand.  With the help of this manual, the programmer can 
understand and maintain the MIDAS code more easily.  If something in the source code 
was not mentioned in this manual, it is usually considered trivial or straightforward for a 
Visual Basic programmer. 
 
This manual focuses on the explanation of following items: 
 
1. The overview of the architecture of MIDAS source code; 
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2. The vital elements and concepts used throughout the MIDAS source code.  For 
instance, global variables and the method of accessing database; 
3. The relation between the source code and the methodology, i.e. how does the code 
implement the methodology; 
4. The linkage between program units, including data communication. 
 
MIDAS was designed and implemented to be self-explanatory and user-friendly, and the 
source code did so, too.  There is a plenty of comments embedded in the code.  
Computational efficiency is not the first priority in developing this software, because 
MIDAS was designed to be a prototypical software that demonstrates the feasibility and 
usability of the incident management and decision making methodology.  Even though, 
thank to the rapid advance in computer technology, the execution efficiency and 
performance of MIDAS are excellent.  A point-estimate calculation is usually performed 
within one second on any platform.  For sensitivity or uncertainty analysis, the running 
time depends on the number of selected uncertain parameters, but usually less than 5 
minutes on a modern PC. 
 
In Chapter 2, the architecture of MIDAS code is described by using a program flow chart.  
It is very helpful for programmers to obtain an overall view of MIDAS before handling 
this software.  In Chapter 3, the programming practices are presented, which includes 
database accessing practices and the use of external Visual Basic objects.  They are used 
throughout the code.  In Chapter 4, the input and output of MIDAS will be described.  In 
Chapter 5, the most important element in the code, the global variables, are explained.  In 
Chapter 6, program units (i.e. subroutines and functions) are described in groups 
according their functions and attributes. 
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2. Program Flow 
 
MIDAS is a multi-window application.  For user’s point of view, the flow map of 
MIDAS operation is shown as in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow map of the operation of MIDAS 
 
From Figure 1, it can be observed that Decision Options window serves as a de facto 
“information and control center” in MIDAS operation.  Model parameters and other 
information within MIDAS can be displayed or edited from Decision Options window 
through the menu bar and various command buttons on that window.  Three kinds of 
analyses – point-estimate calculation, sensitivity analysis and uncertainty analysis – are 
conducted from Decision Options window.  After the user input the required data, Input 
window disappears and Decision Options window is always open until the user quits 
MIDAS. 
 
From programmer’s point of view, the MIDAS flow map changes a little, as shown in 
Figure 2, which is a more useful flowchart for programmers.  Basically, the windows 
before Decision Options window are quite simple and are presented by several simple 
forms.  However, Decision Options window itself is not a complicated one.  It calls many 
other windows, functions and subroutines to carry out various tasks.  To set up Decision 
Options window, two major things have to be done: 
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1. Retrieving data from the knowledge base, and 
2. Displaying the decision option list. 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow map of the program units of MIDAS 
 
From Decision Options window, there are five major program groups available to 
perform their specific tasks.  These program groups are 
 
1. Point-estimate calculation, 
2. Option editing (includes adding and deleting). 
3. Parameter uncertainty specification, 
4. Sensitivity analysis, and 
5. Uncertainty analysis. 
 
Several program units (i.e. subroutines and functions) are associated with achieving each 
major task.  Usually forms are in charge of displaying results and responding inputs, 
while modules are doing calculations.  Those program unit groups are not completely 
independent.  For example, sensitivity and uncertainty analyses call the same set of 
program units belong to point-estimate calculation group to calculate performance 
indexes. 
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Other minor operations are performed by rather simple program units, which can be 
observed from Figure 2.  These program units could be called by other windows, so they 
are designed acting independently.  These minor tasks are 
 
1. Print Report, 
2. Failed component description window, 
3. Save and Restore (the code is embedded in option_list.frm), 
4. PSA data table displaying, 
5. Repair option quick view. 
 
From Figure 2, the programmer can obtain an overview for the architecture of the entire 
MIDAS code and a preliminary understanding about the function of each program units.  
For instance, in option editing task, it should be known that there are three forms 
performing the tasks: one for adding options, one for editing type 2 options and the other 
one for editing type 3 options.  In chapter 6, these program units are grouped according 
their functions and explained more in details.  However, the most complete description 
about the programs should be the comments embedded in the source code. 
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3. Programming Practices 
 
There are some programming practices and conventions used throughout the MIDAS 
code.  It would be better to be presented here before describing global variables and 
program units in later chapters. 
 
3.1. General Conventions 
 
Visual Basic is an object-based, event-driven programming language.  There are two 
types of VB programs written constituting the MIDAS code: 
 
1. Forms: Form is equivalent to window in VB terminology.  A form file constructs a 
window and dictates the behaviors of the objects on the window.  Form files have 
the filename extension .frm. 
2. Modules: Module is a container of callable subroutines and functions.  Module 
files have the filename extension .bas. 
 
In MIDAS code, usually forms are in charge of displaying results and responding inputs, 
while modules are for doing calculations. 
 
All of the real variables in MIDAS are declared as Single, because for the problems 
MIDAS deals with, single precision is precise enough.  Using single precision real 
variables can save a little running time than using double precision variables. 
 
3.2. Retrieving Database 
 
There are many ways to access data from a Microsoft Access database file in a Visual 
Basic application.  In coding MIDAS, a fixed and simple way to retrieve the data from 
the knowledge base was used.  Our purpose is merely to get the data stored in the 
knowledge base, not to modify them.  Thus, the procedure is rather easy, and has been 
proved efficient. 
 
Several variables are declared as global variables for retrieving database: 
 
1. dbname is declared as a String, which represents the knowledge base filename 
with full path.  Its value is set when the Input window is loaded, that is at the 
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beginning of the operation of MIDAS.  Thus, in the rest of program, this value 
doesn’t need to be set again. 
2. optionDB is declared as a Database object, which is a kind of data object in the 
DAO object model. 
3. tutRS, tutRS2, and tutRS3 are declared as Recordset object, which are used to 
created records. 
 
Variable dbname is set when the Input window (data_input_form1) is loaded using the 
following statement: 
 
 dbname = App.Path & “\option_kb.mdb” 
 
because the knowledge base filename is always option_kb.mdb. 
 
Then optionDB is set to connect to the database, according to the DAO rule: 
 
 Set optionDB = DBEngine.Workspaces(0).OpenDatabase(dbname) 
 
Then, the RecordSet, say, tutRS is set to connect to a certain table in the database by the 
following statement: 
 
 Set tutRS = optionDB.OpenRecordset("Cost", dbOpenDynaset) 
 
Here, tutRS was connected to the table Cost in the database. 
 
There are several properties and methods associated with RecordSet that we can use to 
move around in the data table.  In the following, these RecordSet methods used in 
MIDAS code are listed: 
 
1. RecordCount: a RecordSet property that reports the number of records in the 
data table to which the RecordSet was connected.  In the following statement, X 
returns the number of records in the data table. 
X = tutRS.RecordCount 
2. MoveFirst: a RecordSet method that move the record pointer to the first record. 
3. MoveNext: a RecordSet method that move the record pointer to the next record. 
4. MovePrevious: a RecordSet method that move the record pointer to the previous 
record. 
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5. MoveLast: a RecordSet method that move the record pointer to the last record. 
 
To retrieve the wanted data in data tables, we use RecordSet property.  For instance, in 
the data table Cost, there is a field Value.  We would like to get the data in the cell of 
third record, Value field in Cost table, and assign the value to variable Y.  After moving 
pointer to the third record, the statement to do so looks like: 
 
 Y = TutRS!Value 
 
Notice that the type of variable Y should be declared as String, or a type converter is 
needed.  All data in data tables are treated as text.  On the other hand, if there is no data in 
that cell, then variable Y will keep its value.  This is an important concept in database 
retrieving. 
 
3.3. The Built-in Visual Basic ActiveX Controls 
 
In Visual Basic, there are several default controls deployed in the Toolbox, such as 
TextBox, Label, and CommandButton.  They are used extensively in MIDAS.  However, 
for sophisticated tasks, such as printing a report to a selected printer or saving a file with 
specific format, these default controls are not sufficient.  Thus, we need the controls with 
more advanced and flexible functions.  In fact, Visual Basic has a set of built-in ActiveX 
controls that provides a variety of functions to achieve the tasks that users need.  
According to their functions, these ActiveX controls are classified into many control 
groups. 
 
To use these built-in ActiveX controls, users should explicitly add the control groups into 
their project through a specific procedure described below.  After that procedure, those 
ActiveX controls will appear on the Toolbox automatically and are ready to use. 
 
In MIDAS, there are three groups of built-in ActiveX controls used to perform the tasks 
we need.  They are: 
 
1. The ProgressBar control in Microsoft Common Controls 6.0 – used in 
displaying progress bar (progress_bar.frm). 
2. The CommonDialog control in Microsoft Common Dialog Control 6.0 – used 
in Save/Restore (in option_list.frm) 
3. The RichTextBox control in Microsoft Rich TextBox Control 6.0 – used in 
PrintReport (report.frm). 
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The procedure to add an ActiveX control group to the project, say for ProgressBar 
control, is using the Toolbox’s Components dialog (or Project/Components in the 
menu bar), as shown in Figure 3, to check Microsoft Common Controls 6.0 (SP4), and 
then add the control to the form. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Components menu used to add ActiveX controls 
 
There are special rules and techniques for utilizing these three ActiveX controls 
mentioned above.  However they are beyond the scope of this manual.  That information 
can be found in Visual Basic books. 
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4. Input and Output 
 
4.1. Input 
 
There are three ways that enable users to input data into MIDAS, as listed below.  The 
first two are required. 
 
1. Manual input: 
On the Input window, users are required to specify the failed component name 
and the time-to-next-outage.  They are essential to setup the model and perform 
any analysis in MIDAS.  Another kind of manual input is uncertainty 
specification for parameters.  There are many forms (see Section 6.5) available for 
input these uncertainties. 
2. Input from knowledge base: 
Knowledge base contains all the necessary default information about the failed 
component/event, including the PSA data, the weights for the value tree and 
utility functions to perform the analysis.  Not only in the phase of setting up the 
MIDAS model, but during analyzing a minor incident scenario, the knowledge 
base is accessed to provide the necessary data. 
3. Restoring model file:  
Model file is the file that contains all necessary information regarding the current 
model settings, including all parameters related to decision options, parameter 
uncertainties, PSA data, initiating event outcomes and performance measure 
weights.  This file can be saved any time in MIDAS to preserve the model setting.  
The Restore command on Decision Option window, on the other hand, can 
restore a model that has been stored in a model file 
 
Besides, component description file is a text file that created by users to describe the 
specified scenario on Description window.  Its filename should be indicated in the 
knowledge base. 
 
4.2. Output 
 
The Output refers to a preservable output, such as a report printed for a data output file.  
There are two ways that enable users to obtain displaying information or the results of 
analyses in MIDAS, as listed below. 
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1. Print Report: 
Print Report is the formal way for users to obtain the results of analyses, by 
means of printing to printer or saving to a file.  This function is described in 
Section 6.1.5.  There are four Print Report buttons available in MIDAS for 
displaying different types of information: 
• Detailed decision option information; 
• Results of point-estimate calculation; 
• Results of sensitivity analysis; 
• Results of uncertainty analysis. 
2. Saving model file: 
Model file, as mentioned in the previous section, can be saved using Save 
command on Decision Option window.  Model file is a text file, but it’s not 
intended for users to read.  However, for programmers, model file is a good 
source for understanding the code or debugging. 
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5. Global Variables 
 
Global variables are the variables that are accessible anywhere in the program.  
Therefore, usually global variables are the vital elements to the entire program, which 
should be accessible anywhere in the program.  There are some important global 
variables constituting the analysis model of MIDAS and will be described in this chapter. 
 
The global variables are declared in the VB module variables_module, which is 
contained in the module file variables.bas. 
 
5.1. Option List Array 
 
Probably the most important variable in MIDAS is the user-defined-type array – 
option_list_array.  It contains all of the information about the decision options in current 
scenario.  The structure of option_list_array is presented in Table 1 to Table 3, for 
different types of options.  Notice that in the Value column, the values in the font 
Courier New are actual values, while the values in the regular font “Times New Roman” 
are the description of the values. 
 
For convenience of programming, not in the user’s aspect, the three types of decision 
options were numbered as follows. 
 
1. Type 1 option refers to “Continue-as-is” option. 
2. Type 2 option refers to “On-line Repair” option. 
3. Type 3 option refers to “Shutdown and Repair” option. 
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Table 1. The content of option_list_array for type 1 option 
Type 1 Option 
Name Type Value 
description String “Continue as is” 
decision_type Integer 1 
state(0) String “a1” 
duration(0) Single Time-to-next-outage 
repair_state_index Integer 0 
worker_dose Single -- 
worker_number Single -- 
accident_frequency Single -- 
fatality_fraction Single -- 
minor_injury_fraction Single -- 
 
 
 
Table 2. The content of option_list_array for type 2 option 
Type 2 Option 
Name Type Value 
description String “On-line repair” 
decision_type Integer 2 
state(0) String “a1” 
state(1) String “a1” 
state(2) String The 2nd repair state if on-line repair fails 
duration(0) Single On-line repair duration 
duration(1) Single The remaining time to next outage 
duration(2) Single Probability of trip 
duration(3) Single Probability of success 
duration(4) Single The 2nd repair duration if on-line repair fails
repair_state_index Integer Trip IE number 
worker_dose Single As specified 
worker_number Single As specified 
accident_frequency Single As specified 
fatality_fraction Single As specified 
minor_injury_fraction Single As specified 
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Table 3. The content of option_list_array for type 3 option 
Type 3 Option 
Name Type Value 
description String “Shut down and repair” 
decision_type Integer 3 
state(0) String “a” 
state(1) String “b” 
state(2) String “c” 
state(3) String “d” 
…… …… …… 
duration(0) Single State(0) duration 
duration(1) Single State(1) duration 
duration(2) Single State(2) duration 
duration(3) Single State(3) duration 
…… …… …… 
repair_state_index Integer
2 for repair state c 
3 for repair state d 
4 for repair state e 
worker_dose Single As specified 
worker_number Single As specified 
accident_frequency Single As specified 
fatality_fraction Single As specified 
minor_injury_fraction Single As specified 
 
5.2. Uncertainty Data 
 
There are some sets of global variables serving for depicting the uncertainty information 
about certain parameter.  For instance, for T_outage represents the time-to-next-outage 
(hours), which is used in point-estimate calculation, there are three variables representing 
its median value, 95th percentile upper bound and 5th percentile lower bound. 
 
Table 4. Uncertainty variables for time-to-next-outage 
Time to next outage 
T_outage_median Median 
T_outage_upper Upper 
T_outage_lower Lower 
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Other similar “uncertainty variables” are tabulated as follows.  They are used to perform 
sensitivity and uncertainty analysis.  They are all global variables, because they are input 
through different windows and transferred between different procedures. 
 
Table 5. Uncertainty variables for Option List Array 
Option List Array 
Option_list_array_median Median 
Option_list_array_upper Upper 
Option_list_array_lower Lower 
 
For option-list-array uncertainty arrays, they contain the uncertainty information about 
repair state duration (not all transition state durations), and the parameter related to 
worker dose and industrial accident. 
 
Table 6. Uncertainty variables for PM weights 
PM weights 
PM_weights_median Median 
PM_weights_upper Upper 
PM_weights_lower Lower 
 
PM_weights is a user-defined variable (weights_type) contains the weights for five 
performance measures.  For consistency, PM weights should be normalized (sum to be 
unity) after changing any one. 
 
For those uncertainty information associated with parameters, there is a method used in 
MIDAS to judge whether performs sensitivity or uncertainty analysis for a specific 
parameter.  That is the value in its upper variable.  If the upper variable is –1, the 
parameter is regarded as a quantity without uncertainty and won’t perform uncertainty 
analysis.  This rule is used throughout the MIDAS code. 
 
5.3. PSA Data 
 
The user-defined type PSA_data_table contains the information about the frequency 
(1/year) and CCDP for each initiating event at each plant state, that is, a PSA data table 
shown in MIDAS.  Including uncertainty information (user specified), there are eight 
such PSA data tables.  However, to facilitate the user in editing the PSA uncertainties and 
perform analyses based on inherent PSA data uncertainty, default PSA uncertainty values 
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have been provided through PSA study and stored in knowledge base.  Therefore, there 
are totally 14 PSA data tables used in MIDAS, as listed in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. PSA data tables 
PSA Data Tables 
PSA_nominal Nominal PSA data table (point) 
PSA_failed PSA data with failed component (point) 
PSA_nominal_median Nominal PSA data table (median) 
PSA_nominal_upper Nominal PSA data table (upper) 
PSA_nominal_lower Nominal PSA data table (lower) 
PSA_failed_median Failed PSA data table (median) 
PSA_failed_upper Failed PSA data table (upper) 
PSA_failed_lower Failed PSA data table (lower) 
PSA_nominal_default_median Nominal PSA data table (default, median) 
PSA_nominal_default_upper Nominal PSA data table (default, upper) 
PSA_nominal_default_lower Nominal PSA data table (default, lower) 
PSA_failed_default_median Failed PSA data table (default, median) 
PSA_failed_default_upper Failed PSA data table (default, upper) 
PSA_failed_default_lower Failed PSA data table (default, lower) 
 
5.4. Initiating Event Outcomes 
 
The user-defined type IE_out is used to contain various initiating event outcomes.  For 
each initiating event occurrence, there are expected outcomes associated with cost, public 
dose and external attention, which are three of the performance measures.  Thus the 
valuables in Table 8 record the utilities (not actual values) of these three IE outcomes. 
 
Table 8. Initiating Event Outcomes 
Initiating Event Outcomes (utilities) 
IE_Cost Cost 
IE_Dose Public Dose 
IE_External_attention External Attention
 
However, only cost and doses are possible to perform uncertainty analysis, because 
external attention is in a discrete scale.  The uncertainty variables associated with cost 
and doses are listed below.  Notice that they are separated into those containing actual 
values and containing utility values.  The actual values are used in dealing with the input 
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from uncertainty input windows and displaying on Sensitivity Output window, while the 
utility values are used in calculation performance index. 
 
Table 9. Uncertainty of Initiating Event Outcomes 
Uncertainty of Initiating Event Outcomes 
IE_Cost_median Cost median (utility) 
IE_Cost_upper Cost upper (utility) 
IE_Cost_lower Cost lower (utility) 
IE_Dose_median Dose median (utility) 
IE_Dose_upper Dose upper (utility) 
IE_Dose_lower Dose lower (utility) 
IE_Cost_value_median Cost median (actual value) 
IE_Cost_value_upper Cost upper (actual value) 
IE_Cost_value_lower Cost lower (actual value) 
IE_Dose_value_median Dose median (actual value) 
IE_Dose_value_upper Dose upper (actual value) 
IE_Dose_value_lower Dose lower (actual value) 
 
5.5. Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analyses 
 
For recording the results of sensitivity analysis, a user-defined type was developed, which 
is Sensi_Var.  Besides, the information stored in Sensi_Var is used to display on the 
Sensitivity Output window. 
 
For each parameter that can perform uncertainty analysis, there is a corresponding 
Sensi_Var variable declared.  Some of them are arrays.  The list of those variables and 
arrays is presented in Table 10. 
 
There is another important global variable for sensitivity data storage, which is array 
sensi_All.  It is also of the type of Sensi_Var.  This array stores all sensitivity resulting 
data for those parameters that were specified to perform sensitivity analysis.  It is used to 
displaying the results of sensitivity analysis by means of tornado diagram, because it is 
more practical to sort and rank the data within an array. 
 
The global variable Uncert_Items contains the full names of the variables that were 
checked to perform uncertainty analysis. 
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Table 10. Global Variable for Sensitivity Analysis 
Global Variable for Sensitivity Analysis 
sensi_Toutage Time to next outage 
sensi_DowntimeCost Shutdown replacement cost 
sensi_Cost(8) Outcome costs for each IE 
sensi_Dose(8) Outcome doses for each IE 
sensi_lambda_nominal(8, 4) Nominal IE frequency 
sensi_CCDP_nominal(8, 4) Nominal CCDP 
sensi_lambda_failed(8, 4) Failed IE frequency 
sensi_CCDP_failed(8, 4) Failed CCDP 
sensi_temp_dur() On-line repair duration 
sensi_temp_succ_p() On-line repair success probability 
sensi_temp_trip_p() On-line repair trip probability 
sensi_sdrepair_dur() Shutdown Repair duration 
sensi_Accident_Freq() Accident frequency 
sensi_Major_Injury_Frac() Fraction of Major Injury 
sensi_Fatality_Frac() Fraction of Fatality 
sensi_Worker_Dose() Worker Dose 
sensi_Weights(4) PM Weights 
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6. Program Files, Forms, and Modules 
 
Each program file (form or module) in MIDAS is explained in this chapter.  These 
program files are grouped according their functions and explained in specific section.  
The program file name is listed as the sub-section title with a pair of parentheses 
containing the form name or module name that is used in the MIDAS code.  Notice that 
the most complete description about these program units (functions and subroutines) 
contained in program files is the comments embedded in the source code, which are 
designed explanatory. 
 
Table 11 is a summary table of the grouped program files.  It would be helpful to refer to 
the program flow map in Figure 2. 
 
6.1. Forms and Modules for Input and Output 
 
6.1.1. intro.frm (intro_form) 
 
This is a form that just put an MIDAS image and a timer.  It is the first form being loaded 
when executes MIDAS and acts as a welcome page.  The timer was set to wait for 4 
seconds, then this page will disappear and the Input window (data_input.frm) will be 
presented. 
 
6.1.2. data_input.frm (data_input_form1) 
 
This program constructs the Input window for users to input the failed component name 
(in a combo box) and the time-to-next-outage (hours).  In addition, a Quit button and 
Description button were provided.  The code for finding the description filename in 
knowledge base, reading the content in that text file and writing on the Description 
window is in the subroutine Description_button_Click. 
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Table 11. Classified program files and the form or module names 
File name Form or module name 
Input and Output 
intro.frm intro_form 
data_input.frm data_input_form1 
input_confirm.frm data_input_form2 
Comp_Descri.frm Comp_Descri_form 
report.frm Report_form 
repair_info.frm Repair_info_form 
IE_outcomes.bas Knowledge_base_data 
Option List 
option_list.frm option_list_form 
option_list_module.bas Option_list_module 
Option Editing 
add_option.frm add_option_form 
type2_edit.frm type2_edit_form 
type3_edit.frm type3_edit_form 
Point Calculation 
PSA_data.frm PSA_data_form 
PI_form.frm PI_form 
PSA_data_module.bas PSA_data_module 
decision_module.bas Decision_module 
utility_module.bas utility_module 
create_final_PI.bas create_final_PI_module 
Uncertainty Specification 
downtime_uncert.frm Downtime_uncertainty 
T_outage_uncert.frm T_outage_uncertainty 
PSA_data_uncert.frm PSA_data_uncertainty 
IE_Cost_uncert.frm IE_Cost_uncertainty 
weights_uncert.frm weights_uncertainty 
type2_uncert.frm type2_uncertainty 
Sensitivity Analysis 
sensi_output.frm Sensi_output_form 
sensi_analysis.bas Sensi_analysis_module 
sensi_reset.bas Sensitivity_Reset 
Uncertainty Analysis 
uncert_results.frm uncert_results_form 
uncert_confirm.bas Uncert_Confirm_form 
uncert_analysis.bas Uncert_analysis_module 
random_extraction.bas random_extraction 
Others 
progress_bar.frm ProgressBar_form 
variables.bas Variables_module 
general.bas General 
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6.1.3. input_confirm.frm (data_input_form2) 
 
This is a small window that links Input window and Decision Option window.  The main 
purpose of this window is for users to conform the input values.  After click OK button, 
MIDAS retrieving all needed data in knowledge base and construct the model.  These 
commands are set in this window. 
 
6.1.4. Comp_Descri.frm (Comp_Descri_form) 
 
There is a simple text box with a close button put on this form, which is used to display 
the content in a specified text file.  The text file contains the information about the 
selected failed component, which is prepared by user.  This window was designed to be 
resizable. 
 
The code for finding the description filename, reading the content in that text file and 
writing on this window is in the calling subroutine. 
 
6.1.5. report.frm (Report_form) 
 
This form constructs the Print Report window, which serves as the output facility in 
MIDAS.  It is the only way to output the results of analyses to a readable and preservable 
form, such as saving to a file or printing to a printer.  This form will be called by four 
windows, which are Decision Option window, Point-Estimate Output window, Sensitivity 
Output window, and Uncertainty Output window, to display their results.  These calling 
windows supply (in subroutine report_button_Click) the real contents displayed 
on the Print Report window. 
 
Print Report window is a Rich Text Format (RTF) editor, which is a standard for storing 
information along with text.  Thus, RTF editor provides those capabilities beyond a plain 
text editor does, including mixing different fonts, sizes, colors and attributes.  Actually, a 
RTF editor has many basic text-manipulation functions that a word processor has.  The 
functions and ability of RTF editors are between those of plain text editors and full-
functioned word processors. 
 
RichTextBox control is included in Microsoft Rich TextBox Controls 6.0, which should 
be added to the project beforehand through procedure described in Section 3.3. 
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The prupose of designing Print Report window as a RTF editor is to provide the user the 
basic ability to preliminarily manipulate the output information into a formal form, like 
centering the title line, highlighting the item titles, etc.  Then, it could be printed out as a 
draft formatted record, or, after saving to a RTF file, it can be transfer to a word 
processor, to further refine it. 
 
A toolbar was set on the top of the window.  It enables users to manipulate the selected 
text using the toolbar functions.  The toolbar contains FontName combobox, 
FontSize combobox, FontColor combobox, style buttons, alignment buttons, and 
cut/paste buttons.  They are initialized in the subroutine FormLoad. 
 
The output facilities were implemented in subroutines SaveFile and PrintFile.  Again, 
common dialog boxes were used.  CommonDialog1 is the dialog box for guiding users 
to save a RTF file (the default setting).  CommonDialog2 is the dialog box designed for 
users to select and adjust a printer, and print the contents shown on the Print Report 
window.  Notice that it will print the whole report as a job.  It is not allowed to print 
individual page, because of technical complexity. 
 
When quit the Print Report window, the program will check if the content has been 
changed and warn the user to save, through using the variable Changed.  This is a 
common way for all window editors. 
 
6.1.6. repair_info.frm (Repair_info_form) 
 
This is a simple window just for displaying information about repair option selected.  
There is only one subroutine FormLoad in this program file.  All information are shown 
using TextBoxes.  It could be called from Decision Option window or Performance Index 
window. 
 
6.1.7. IE_outcomes.bas (Knowledge_base_data) 
 
The function of this module is to read the values in three data tables in the knowledge 
base: IE Outcomes, Downtime Cost and PM Weights.  Then assign these values to the 
corresponding global variables. 
 
In IE Outcomes, cost and dose values are read and converted to utility values in this 
module. 
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6.2. Forms and Modules for Option List 
 
6.2.1. option_list.frm (option_list_form) 
 
This program constructs the de facto control center of MIDAS – Decision Option 
window, and responds the requests from users by pressing buttons and clicking menu 
commands. 
 
The reaction of pressing Delete button is similar to that of pressing Edit or Add button.  
The option list and option_list_array will be updated and rearranged. 
 
Form_Load check the duration of the last transition state for options except type 1 
option.  If the input value of time-to-next-outage is not long enough to sustain the 
required time of state transition and repair for some options, their final durations will 
become negative.  In this case, a warning message will appear displaying the number of 
impossible options and prompting users to change the input value of time-to-next-outage.  
If the user wants to move on, the impossible options will be removed from both the 
option list and from the option_list_array variable.  The information about these 
impossible options are contained in the array negative_option.  When this array has a 
negative value, it means that the related option is not valid 
 
If there is no “continue-as-is” option in the current scenario, and the time-to-next-outage 
is too short so that no option is possible to perform repair, the user will be forced to go 
back to Input window to re-input the value of time-to-next-outage. 
 
The consistency check of the input value of time-to-next-outage is in this form, not in the 
Input window, because until the code executes to this point, the option information has 
not been available. 
 
After consistency check of the input value of time-to-next-outage, Form_Load fills the 
necessary data to the option list, and is ready for performing various analyses. 
The menu bar consists of several menus and commands, which were described in User’s 
Manual.  Most of the commands are executed by calling other subroutines, except 
Save/Restore.  The code for Save/Restore is embedded in this form. 
 
To save current model to a model file, the key global variables listed in following are 
written to the specified file. 
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1. Time-to-next-outage and its uncertainty; 
2. Downtime Cost and its uncertainty; 
3. The parameters in option_list_array and their uncertainties; 
4. PSA data and their uncertainties; 
5. IE outcomes (Dose and Cost) and their uncertainties; 
6. PM weights and their uncertainties. 
 
To restore a saved model file, theses items are read and assigned to the corresponding 
variables, and then the option list is re-loaded to see the variation. 
 
Common dialog boxes are used for file I/O.  CommonDialog1 is the dialog box for 
saving a .txt file (the default setting).  CommonDialog2 is the dialog box designed for 
users to select a text file and restore the model from it. 
 
Another thing should be mentioned here is about the uncertainty specification for a type 3 
option, which is requested through a command in the menu bar.  When a type 3 option is 
selected to specify the uncertainties associated with its option parameters, a “type2” 
uncertainty editing window will appear with the probabilities of success and trip are 
disabled, because the parameters of type 3 option that could be uncertain are those also 
for type 2 option. 
 
6.2.2. option_list_module.bas (Option_list_module) 
 
This module is called from input_confirm.frm after confirmation of the input values.  
The task done in this module is reading the option parameters regarding the failed 
component selected from the knowledge base.  In other words, the function of this 
module is retrieving option-related data from the knowledge base and setting up the 
option_list_array variable. 
 
6.3. Forms for Option Editing 
 
6.3.1. add_option.frm (add_option_form) 
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This is a window for users to add a new decision option, do the due editing for the new 
option, and then show the new option on the Decision Option window.  If there is already 
a “continue as is” option, it’s not allowed to add another “continue as is” option. 
 
First, the program code judges the option type that user selected to add.  The rule of 
thumb is about the same for three types of options: 
 
1. If option type 2 or 3 was selected, the corresponding edit window will be brought 
out to specify the option parameters.  Type 1 option is easy to deal with, which is 
staying at state a1 for T_outage. 
2. Append the new option to the global variable option_list_array.  The way to do 
is duplicating the content to a temporary variable, clearing the content, and re-
writing the content. 
3. Renew the content of option list on Decision Option window. 
 
6.3.2. type2_edit.frm (type2_edit_form) 
 
This is a window for editing type 2 option.  This form can be called for two purposes: 
 
1. Being called from option_list.frm to edit an existing type 2 option. 
2. Being called from add_option.frm to build a new type 2 option. 
 
In the first purpose, the two columns (Original Values and New Values) on this form will 
be shown for users to input the new values referring to the original values.  In the second 
purpose, only New Values column is shown. 
 
All of the input data manipulations are coded in the subroutine ok_button_Click.  They 
are checking the consistency of input data, update option_list_array, and update the list 
on Decision Option window. 
 
6.3.3. type3_edit.frm (type3_edit_form) 
 
This is a window for editing type 3 option.  This form can be called for two purposes: 
 
1. Being called from option_list.frm to edit an existing type 3 option. 
2. Being called from add_option.frm to build a new type 3 option. 
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In the first purpose, the text box displaying current repair state and a Change Repair State 
button are shown on this form for users to the repair state in necessary.  If so, a repair-
state-list will appear.  However, for the second purpose, only the repair-state-list is shown 
for users to select a repair state for the new type 3 option. 
 
All of the input data manipulations are coded in the subroutine ok_button_Click.  They 
are checking the consistency of input data, update option_list_array, and update the list 
on Decision Option window. 
 
6.4. Forms and Modules for Point Calculation 
 
6.4.1. PSA_data.frm (PSA_data_form) 
 
Actually this is a window only for displaying PSA data.  There is only a subroutine 
Form_Load in this program file. 
 
PSA data are read from global variables and displayed on the text boxes.  Then the 
program checks the same PSA data in “nominal” and “failed” tables.  If they are 
different, then the color (ForeColor) of the “failed” data is changed to red. 
 
6.4.2. PI_form.frm (PI_form) 
 
This is the window for displaying the results of point-estimate calculation, that is, the 
performance index (PI).  Thus it shows the Performance Index window.  In sub 
Form_Paint, only total PI for each decision option is shown.  By pressing Show Details 
button, the table of PI values contributed from different performance measures is shown.  
In addition, a segment of PrintReport code is presented. 
 
6.4.3. PSA_data_module.bas (PSA_data_module) 
 
Although this is a massive module, the working principle is simple.  It is called inside 
input_confirm.frm after confirmation of the input values.  The task done in this module 
is reading PSA data tables from the knowledge base.  These PSA data tables includes the 
following four tables: 
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1. PSA data table under nominal condition, 
2. PSA data table with failed specific component, 
3. Default PSA upper-bound data table under nominal condition, 
4. Default PSA upper-bound data table with failed specific component. 
 
After the medium and upper-bound values of certain PSA data are obtained, the lower-
bound value of the PSA data can be calculated using the following formula: 
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which is the property of log-normal distribution.  X50 is the median value, while X05 is the 
lower-bound value (5th percentile) and X95 is the lower-bound value (95th percentile). 
 
All of the PSA data with failed-component are assigned twice: one is assigning with the 
value of nominal data; another one is read from the knowledge base.  It is based on the 
design principle of the knowledge base.  If the PSA datum with failed-component is not 
different from the nominal datum, the corresponding cell in the knowledge base must be 
empty and no value will be read.  Therefore, the PSA data with failed-component are 
assigned with the nominal values first, if there are values in the failed-component data 
tables in the knowledge base, these values will be read and replace the original 
assignments. 
 
6.4.4. decision_module.bas (Decision_module) 
 
This module contains only one function, which is calculate_module_outcome.  This 
function calculates the expected utility of a single decision-tree module.  The concept of 
decision-tree module is that when the plant stays under a certain plant state for a period of 
mission time, T, it’s equivalent to a chance node in the decision tree that could happen an 
initiating event with a probability.  Assume that the frequency (per year) of occurrence of 
any IE is λtot, then 
 
∑
=
=
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where λi is the occurrence frequency of i-th IE.  Then during the mission time T, the 
probability that the i-th IE doesn’t happen is Pi, and 
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Therefore, the probability that no IE happens during the mission time is P0, and 
 
TtoteP λ−=0  
 
Once one IE happens to the plant during the mission time, there is a conditional 
probability of core damage, which is CCDP.  If the core is damaged, the outcome utility 
becomes unity.  Otherwise, the utility is the function of the IE outcome. 
 
From the probabilities and utilities of IE outcomes, one can calculate the expected utility 
for this decision-tree module.  That is what this function does. 
 
The function uses the PSA data tables, the option list to look for the state and duration.  
The input variable utility_input also serves as output variable, so it is declared as ByRef 
(call by reference), which is the only one in the MIDAS code.  Actually utility_input is a 
6-element array, which contains expected utility of each PM and core damage probability 
(i.e. expected CCDP). 
 
6.4.5. utility_module.bas (utility_module) 
 
This module consists of the following five functions: 
 
1. Industrial_accident_utility 
2. External_attention_utility 
3. Cost_utility 
4. Dose_utility 
5. Worker_dose_utility 
 
Each function calculates its utility function from the given outcome regarding its 
performance measure.  For discrete PM scales, i.e. those in the first two functions, the 
utilities are obtained by search-and-assign.  For continue PM scales, i.e. those in the last 
three functions, the utilities are calculated by interpolation. 
 
There is an efficiency issue in this module.  Each time the given outcome is compared 
with the scale value (i.e. each do-loop run in the function), the scale values should be 
read from the knowledge base.  It makes that the program accesses database too often.  It 
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is supposed that the program efficiency will be decreased.  However, according to the 
results of test runs, the efficiency of computation doesn’t decrease to the extent that a 
human can feel. 
 
6.4.6. create_final_PI.bas (create_final_PI_module) 
 
This is the module that calculates the various PI values (and total PI) for options 
according to their decision type.  The resulting output of this module is the array 
final_PI(X, 6). X stands for the number of options.  The second dimension stands for 
PM, and the last element in this dimension is the total PI, which is used to make decision. 
 
This module is called frequently in sensitivity and uncertainty analyses to reflect the 
impact of variation of parameters to total PI.  This module calls decision_module.bas to 
calculate modular expected utilities of performance measures.  Both modules respond to 
the variation of all can-do-sensitivity parameters, expect IE outcomes.  Thus, the utilities 
of IE outcomes are re-evaluate when the IE come uncertainties are specified. 
 
6.5. Forms for Uncertainty Specification 
 
6.5.1. downtime_uncert.frm (Downtime_uncertainty) 
 
This is the window for users to input the uncertainties associated with downtime cost.  
When the median value or upper value is input, the lower value will be calculated 
automatically.  When the OK button is pressed, the program will check the consistency of 
these input values, and then store them into appropriate global variables. 
 
6.5.2. T_outage_uncert.frm (T_outage_uncertainty) 
 
This is the window for users to input the uncertainties associated with time-to-next-
outage.  When the median value or upper value is input, the lower value will be 
calculated automatically.  When the OK button is pressed, the program will check the 
consistency of these input values, and then store them into appropriate global variables. 
 
6.5.3. PSA_data_uncert.frm (PSA_data_uncertainty) 
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Although this is a massive program file, the working principle is the same as other 
uncertainty-specifying forms.  The size of this program is due to the number of initiating 
events (9), the number of plant states (5), the number of PSA data types (2, frequency and 
CCDP) and the component states (2, nominal and failed) that should be processed.  
Therefore, this program deals with 180 PSA data, not consider their uncertainties. 
 
This program constructs the window for users to input the uncertainties associated with 
PSA data.  As mentioned in previous paragraph, each PSA datum can be regarded as a 
element in a 4-dimensional array, that is, 
 
(Initiating event type, Plant state, PSA data type, Component state) 
 
Thus, the frequency of ATWS at plant state c with the component failed is (ATWS, c, 
frequency, failed). 
 
However, in MIDAS, PSA data are not processed in this way.  From Section 5.3, it can 
be learned that the user-defined data type PSA_data_table contains initiating event type, 
PSA data type and plant state.  Then several global variables are declared to record the 
PSA data under different component state (nominal or failed) and their uncertainties 
(user-input and default). 
 
This form is called from the menu in Decision Option window as one of the four different 
PSA data tables: 
 
1. IE frequency, nominal component state (IE_nominal), 
2. IE frequency, failed component state (IE_failed), 
3. CCDP, nominal component state (CCDP_nominal), 
4. CCDP, failed component state (CCDP_failed). 
 
In loading this program, it is judged first that which PSA data table should be displayed 
to response the user request.  On each table, there are 45 data items (as median value) 
with their uncertainties (upper and lower values). 
 
For each data item, when the median value or upper value is input, the lower value will 
be calculated automatically.  When the OK button is pressed, the program will check the 
consistency of these input values for each initiating event, and then store them into 
appropriate global variables. 
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6.5.4. IE_Cost_uncert.frm (IE_Cost_uncertainty) 
 
This is the window for users to input the uncertainties associated with the cost of IE 
outcome.  It’s also used for input the uncertainties associated with the dose of IE 
outcome, by changing the window caption.  It is judged from the menu selection tag in 
Decision Option window. 
 
For each initiating event, when the median value or upper value is input, the lower value 
will be calculated automatically.  When the OK button is pressed, the program will check 
the consistency of these input values for each initiating event, and then store them into 
appropriate global variables. 
 
6.5.5. weights_uncert.frm (weights_uncertainty) 
 
This is the window for users to input the uncertainties associated with PM weights.  For 
each PM weight, when the median value or upper value is input, the lower value will be 
calculated automatically.  When the OK button is pressed, the program will check the 
consistency of these input values for each PM weight, and then store them into 
appropriate global variables. 
 
6.5.6. type2_uncert.frm (type2_uncertainty) 
 
This is the window for users to input the uncertainties associated with parameters in type 
2 options.  For each parameter in type 2 options, when the median value or upper value is 
input, the lower value will be calculated automatically.  When the OK button is pressed, 
the program will check the consistency of these input values for each parameter in type 2 
options, and then store them into appropriate global variables. 
 
6.6. Forms and Modules for Sensitivity Analysis 
 
6.6.1. sensi_output.frm (Sensi_output_form) 
 
This is the program that constructs the window for displaying the results of sensitivity 
analysis by means of two tornado diagrams.  There are ten Shape objects deployed on 
each panel to display the tornado diagram.  The program adjusts the starting point, end 
point and length of each Shape object to reflect the PI variation from sensitivity analysis 
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for a parameter.  Randomly different colors are assigned to Shape objects; however, same 
parameter on both panels keeps the same color for consistency. 
 
All of the data input to this form is contained in the global variable sensi_All.  The output 
of this form is the global variable Uncert_Items, which contains the full names of the 
variables that were checked to perform uncertainty analysis.  It is sent to the module 
uncert_analysis.bas to do uncertainty analysis. 
 
6.6.2. sensi_analysis.bas (Sensi_analysis_module) 
 
This is the module that performs the calculation for sensitivity analysis.  It contains the 
subroutine (Sensi_Analysis) that initializes the environment and processes each type of 
parameters according to their inherent properties.  In addition, this module also contains 
those subroutines that perform sensitivity calculations for massive IE-outcome and PSA 
data in batch mode. 
 
The results of sensitivity analyses are stored in the global variables, which described in 
Section 5.5.  In the end of this module, all of the sensitivity resulting data for those 
parameters that were specified to perform sensitivity analysis is stored in a global 
variable sensi_All, and send to the form sensi_output.frm to display. 
 
6.6.3. sensi_reset.bas (Sensitivity_Reset) 
 
This module is called to reset the uncertainty setting associated with the option 
parameters, that is, the parameters in option_list_array variable.  This module is called 
when the option list is modified, or when the user requests it through the menu command 
in Decision Option window. 
 
6.7. Forms and Modules for Uncertainty Analysis 
 
6.7.1. uncert_results.frm (uncert_results_form) 
 
This is the program that constructs the window for displaying the results of uncertainty 
analysis by means of histograms and the bars that represent the confidence of being 
optimal option. 
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6.7.2. uncert_confirm.bas (Uncert_Confirm_form) 
 
This is a window that links Sensitivity Output window and Uncertainty Output window.  
On this window, the selected parameters for performing uncertainty analysis are shown 
on the left panel, which is a frame containing 20 labels, for user confirmation (in sub 
Form_Load). 
 
On the right panel, there is a text box for inputting the number of sampling in uncertainty 
analysis, which is represented by the variable history_number.  If OK button is pressed, 
the number is read and the sub montecarlo (in uncert_analysis.bas) is activated to 
perform Monte Carlo calculation.  Then from this form, the uncert_results_form is 
called to display the results. 
 
6.7.3. uncert_analysis.bas (Uncert_analysis_module) 
 
This is the module that performs the calculation for uncertainty analysis.  The input of 
this module is the global variable Uncert_Items, which contains the full names of the 
variables that were checked to perform uncertainty analysis.  Therefore, the first step is to 
identify these parameters, and then call the random number generator to perform 
uncertainty calculation. 
 
6.7.4. random_extraction.bas (random_extraction) 
 
This module provides two functions (extract_uniform and extract_lognorm) acting as 
random number generators, which generate random numbers in a uniform distribution 
and a lognormal distribution, respectively. 
 
6.8. Other Forms and Modules 
 
6.8.1. progress_bar.frm (ProgressBar_form) 
 
This is a window putting a ProgressBar control.  The ProgressBar control shows the 
progress of a lengthy operation by filling a rectangle from left to right.  In MIDAS, it was 
used to show the progress of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses.  ProgressBar control is 
included in Microsoft Common Controls 6.0, which should be added to the project 
beforehand through procedure described in Section 3.3. 
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The only thing did in the code of this form is putting the location of progress bar in the 
center of the screen.  Actual dynamic behavior of progress bar is controlled in the 
program unit that calls this form. 
 
6.8.2. variables.bas (Variables_module) 
 
The only function of this module is storing all of the global variables declarations.  It 
does not do any calculation.  A complete description of the global variables used in 
MIDAS code is presented in Chapter 5. 
 
6.8.3. general.bas (General) 
 
This is a module that contains several independent public callable program units.  There 
are four program units in this module: 
 
1. Function maximum: return the bigger one of two input variables. 
2. Sub BubbleSortAscent: Sort the input array from smallest to largest with the 
index number changed by using Bubble Sorting.  This is useful in displaying the 
results of sensitivity analysis, because the sensitivity of parameters should be 
sorted to present a tornado diagram. 
3. Sub BubbleSortDescent: Sort the input array from largest to smallest with the 
index number changed by using Bubble Sorting. 
4. Sub Normalize: For normalizing PM weights to let their sum equals to unity.  It is 
used in the sensitivity analysis of PM weights. 
 
